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BUSHv. GORE: LOOKING AT BAKER v. 
CARR IN A CONSERVATIVE MIRROR 
Robert f. Pushaw, Jr.* 
A Southern state engages in electoral shenanigans, thereby 
precipitating a national crisis. Most United States Supreme 
Court Justices conclude that the ordinary political process will 
not remedy the problem. Unfortunately for them, the justiciabil-
ity doctrines and federalis~I?- generally prohibit federal judicial 
intervention in state electoral matters, absent a clear and egre-
gious violation of the Constitution (such as racial discrimina-
tion). Although the state's action strikes these Justices as unfair, 
it does not run afoul of any federal constitutional provision. 
Undaunted, they make up new equal protection law and hold 
that the state has failed to comply with it. Several Justices bit-
terly dissent that the majority's blatant political interference will 
erode respect for the Court as the impartial guardian of the rule 
of law. 
Why bother with yet another recap of Bush v. Gore?1 Be-
cause the exact same summary applies to Baker v. Carr.2 There 
the Warren Court perceived a crisis that defied a political solu-
tion: Tennessee and many other states had always apportioned 
legislative districts to reflect various interests (e.g., geographic, 
political, economic, and demographic), often with the aim of 
maintaining the electoral strength of conservative rural areas vis-
a-vis the rapidly growing (and predominantly liberal) cities and 
suburbs.3 The Court found justiciable a claim that the Equal 
* Earl F. Nelson Professor, University of Missouri School of Law; Visiting Profes-
sor, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D., Yale, 1988. Thanks to Tracey George, 
Chris Guthrie, Grant Nelson, Jim Pfander, and the editors of Constitutional Commen-
tary for their help in shaping the ideas in this Essay. 
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) {per curiam). 
2. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
3. See id at 187-95 (describing this allocation of legislative seats); see also id. at 
268-69, 301-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Although the Justices did not mention the 
ideological implications of apportionment, rural overrepresentation entrenched the po-
litical power of conservatives against more liberal urbanites, whose voting numbers had 
skyrocketed as Americans migrated to cities and as property qualifications for voting 
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Protection Clause required apportionment to be based solely on 
population, despite the dissenters' arguments that (1) nothing in 
that Clause, or any other constitutional provision, authorized 
this result, and (2) the majority had abandoned the principles of 
judicial restraint embedded in the ideas of stare decisis, justicia-
bility, and federalism. 
For the past four decades, the Court has steadfastly adhered 
to Baker and the "one person, one vote" standard it spawned. 
Moreover, although some legal scholars initially criticized Baker, 
within a few years they had generally accepted its validity, and 
today the opinion meets with near-universal acclairn.4 In short, 
Baker is an unassailable twentieth-century landmark. 
Therefore, it should hardly be surprising that the Court de-
cided Bush precisely the way it decided Baker. Once again, an 
electoral emergency arose-the 2000 presidential candidates' 
deadlock in Florida-that struck the majority as insoluble 
through normal political channels. Once again, over acrimoni-
ous dissents, the Court created an unprecedented equal protec-
tion "right" (to state government consistency in counting votes) 
and ignored concerns for both federalism (which counseled def-
erence to Florida officials as they tried to work out the ballot 
disputes) and justiciability (which militated against judicial re-
view, at least until the state and Congress had completed their 
constitutional roles in selecting the presidential electors). 
What should raise eyebrows, however, is that Bush v. Gore 
has caused law professors who have canonized Baker to wail and 
gnash their collective teeth.5 If Baker was right, how can Bush 
be wrong? Because the former reached a liberal result, and the 
latter a conservative one? Such a nakedly political argument 
simply will not do, especially if made by mainstream scholars, 
who have steadfastly justified Warren Court decisions like Baker 
as grounded in constitutional "law," not "politics."6 For such in-
tellectuals, consistency demands accepting the correctness of 
both Baker and Bush. Conversely, those few conservative theo-
reticians who have condemned Baker as exemplifying Warren 
Court activism cannot, in fairness, applaud Bush. Rather, they 
must either swallow Baker or spit out Bush. 
were abolished. See Gus Tyler, Court Versus Legislature, 27 L. & Contemp. Probs. 390, 
395-98 (1962). 
4. See infra notes 120-132 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra Part II.B (discussing this response). 
6. See infra notes 51-71, 121-130 and accompanying text. 
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For those of us who cling to the quaint notion that the Jus-
tices should apply rules of law rather than impose their political 
preferences, however, the only coherent conclusion is that both 
decisions were wrong. I will develop this thesis by examining 
Baker and Bush in turn, then explaining why these two opinions 
rested upon similarly faulty reasoning and cannot be materially 
distinguished. 
I. THE BAKER EARTHQUAKE AND ITS AFfERSHOCKS 
A. LEGALBACKGROUND 
Baker broke sharply with over a century of precedent. In 
Luther v. Borden,7 the Court deferred to the previous determina-
tion of Congress and the President that Rhode Island's govern-
ment satisfied Article IV, Section 4, which provides that "the 
United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a re-
publican form of government."8 Luther did not hold that all 
complaints under this "Guarantee Clause" were nonjusticiable. 
Most pertinently, the Court recognized the validity of Rhode Is-
land's temporary declaration of martial law to meet threats to its 
very existence, but declined "to inquire to what extent, [n]or un-
der what circumstances, that power may be exercised by a State" 
7. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
8. Id. at 42-45. The Rhode Island charter government, which had existed from 
colonial times, declared martial law in the early 1840s to defeat a rebellious new govern-
ment. Borden, a sheriff of the charter government, broke into the home of Luther, an 
official of the new one. Luther claimed that Borden had lacked legal authority to act be-
cause the charter government violated the Republican Form of Government Clause. Id 
at 34-38. 
The Court held that this Clause did not empower it to decide this question, but 
rather required deference to Congress's judgment that the charter government was the 
legitimate one and hence "republican." Id. at 42. Moreover, as Congress had granted 
the President sole discretion to decide when the militia was needed to quell an insurrec-
tion, and as he had exercised this power by recognizing the charter government, the 
Court should yield to him. Id at 43-45. 
In short, Luther's finding of nonjusticiability was limited to the situation where the 
federal political branches had determined that one of two rival state governments was 
valid. Id at 42-45. The Court thus acknowledged the significant, but not exclusive, 
power of Congress and the President in ensuring each state a republican government. 
Other cases treating claims under this Clause as political questions include Georgia 
v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 71-77 (1867) (refusing to second-guess Congress's aboli-
tion of Georgia's government during Reconstruction); Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham, 
178 U.S. 548 (1899) (holding nonjusticiable a complaint that Kentucky's resolution of a 
contested election for governor deprived voters of a republican government); Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 278-79 (1900) (avoiding the question of whether Congress must 
establish republican governments in the territories before they become states). 
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before a Guarantee Clause violation would occur.9 This quali-
fier would make no sense if the Justices thought they never 
could consider whether a state's actions ran afoul of that Clause. 
Nonetheless, the Court imposed such an absolute political-
question bar in Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon,10 which dis-
missed a corporation's claim that a state law passed by initiative 
rather than statute rendered its government non-republican.11 
Moreover, the Court rejected the corporation's attempt to avoid 
this result by asserting a separate cause of action under the Four-
teenth Amendment, callin~ this ploy a "superficial" elevation of 
"form" over "substance."1 Subsequent cases held all Republi-
can Form of Government issues to be nonjusticiable.13 
Applying this precedent, the Court routinely rejected chal-
lenges to state apportionment schemes.14 For instance, in Cole-
9. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 45. 
10. 223 U.S. 118 (1912). The Court ignored numerous cases after Luther adjudicat-
ing Guarantee Clause claims. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175-
76 (1874) (evaluating, but rejecting, the argument that a state's failure to grant its female 
citizens the right to vote violated the Republican Form of Government Clause); In re 
Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1891) (ruling that a state court's interpretation of a state 
statute to ascertain whether it had been duly enacted did not violate this Clause); Forsyth 
v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506,519 (1897) (holding that a state could, consistent with Section 
4 of Article IV, leave the determination of the territorial boundaries of municipalities to 
its courts rather than its legislature); Michigan ex rei. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 
(1905) (concluding that a state legislature did not render its government non-republican 
by creating, altering, and dividing the property of school districts); South Carolina v. 
United States, 199 U.S. 437, 454 (1905) (finding no violation under this Clause). The jus-
ticiability ban established in Pacific States lasted eighty years. See New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 184-85 (1992) (conceding that the Court had, since 1912, misinter-
preted Luther and its progeny as prohibiting all Guarantee Clause claims). 
For present purposes, the key point is that when Baker was decided in 1962, all the 
Justices assumed that the Republican Form of Government Clause raised political rather 
than judicial questions. 
11. Pacific States, 223 U.S. at 142-51. 
12. Id at 137, 139-40. A similar attempt to repackage a Guarantee Clause claim as 
a Fourteenth Amendment one succeeded in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), as ex-
plained infra Part I. B. 
13. See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 609-12 (1937) (involv-
ing a state legislative delegation to an agency of the power to set milk prices); Ohio ex 
rei. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74,79 (1930) (dealing with a rule requir-
ing that state statutes could not be invalidated absent the agreement of all but one state 
court justice); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1916) (concern-
ing a worker's compensation law); O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244,247-48 (1915) (involv-
ing a statutory delegation to the courts of the power to establish drainage districts); Mar-
shall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1913) (pertaining to Indiana's constitutional 
amendment procedure). 
14. See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950) ("Federal courts consistently 
refuse to exercise their equity powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's 
geographical distribution of electoral strength among its political subdivisions."); Ohio ex 
rei. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565,569-70 (1916) (holding nonjusticiable the claim that 
the invalidation of a state reapportionment statute by referendum violated the Republi-
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grove v. Green/5 four of the seven participating Justices affirmed 
the dismissal of a complaint alleging that an Illinois statute had 
unconstitutionally established districts for congressional repre-
sentatives that did not reflect population changes. In the princi-
pal opinion, Justice Frankfurter and two colleagues ruled that 
"[v)iolation of the great guaranty of a republican form of gov-
ernment in States cannot be challenged in the courts."16 Justice 
Rutledge assumed the case to be justiciable, but concluded that 
the district court had equitable discretion to decline to exercise 
jurisdiction in light of the delicate relationship between Congress 
and the states in determining congressional districts. 17 
Many cases followed Colegrove in repelling constitutional 
attacks on state electoral laws, usually based upon Justice Frank-
furter's reasoning.18 The lone exception to this political question 
analysis arose when states racially discriminated in electoral mat-
ters, thereby violating individual and minority-group rights un-
der the Fifteenth Amendment.19 
can Form of Government Clause). 
15. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
16. ld. at 556. 
17. Id at 564-66. Three dissenters saw no political question obstacle and would 
have struck down the statute on equal protection grounds. ld. at 566-74 (Black, J., dis-
senting). 
18. Although in Colegrove four of seven Justices found the matter justiciable, in 
almost all the following cases the Court apparently assumed the opposite and issued one-
line opinions that typically referenced Colegrove. See, e.g., Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 
920 (1956) (per curiam) (involving the same Tennessee statute that would be disputed in 
Baker); see also Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959) (per curiam); Radford v. Gary, 
352 U.S. 991 (1957) (per curiam); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952) (per curiam); 
Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952) (per curiam); Tedesco v. Bd. of Supervisors, 339 
U.S. 940 (1950) (per curiam); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947) (per curiam); 
Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (per curiam); cf. South, 339 U.S. at 277 (com-
bining this "political question" approach with Justice Rutledge's "equitable discretion" 
framework). In the single instance in which the Court exercised discretion to reach the 
merits, it rejected the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from ap-
propriately diffusing political initiative between its sparsely and densely populated coun-
ties. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948) (per curiam). See generally Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 252 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (noting that, regardless of Cole-
grove's actual holding, the Court had interpreted the decision as based upon the political 
question doctrine and a refusal to countenance any possible Fourteenth Amendment 
claim). 
19. For example, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), struck down an Ala-
bama statute which had redistricted a city in order to deprive blacks of their right to vote. 
ld at 340-45. The Court distinguished this "singl[ing) out [ofj a readily isolated segment 
of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment" from the political question pre-
sented in Colegrove, where the plaintiffs "complained only of a dilution of the strength of 
their votes." Id at 346. Other cases finding similar Fifteenth Amendment violations in-
cluded Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
The seminal case is Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (invalidating a state law 
that facially discriminated on the basis of race). 
364 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:359 
B. THE BAKER DECISION 
In Baker v. Carr,Z0 urban Tennessee voters claimed that a 
1901 statute apportioning legislative districts, which had not 
been amended to account for the large population shift awax 
from rural areas, had unconstitutionally debased their votes. 1 
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan reinvented the 
political question doctrine in two significant ways. 
First, he asserted that "it is the relationship between the ju-
diciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, 
and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which 
gives rise to the 'political question."'22 Hence, Justice Brennan 
deemed this doctrine inapplicable because the Court was not 
considering a question decided by a coequal government de-
partment, but rather "the consistency of state action with the 
Federal Constitution."23 He distinguished numerous cases hold-
ing to the contrary (such as Colegrove and its progeny, which 
emphasized federalism concerns) as grounded upon limits on the 
federal judiciary's equity power, not justiciability.24 
Second, Justice Brennan declared that the presence of a po-
litical question could be determined only through a multi-factor 
"case-by-case inquiry. "25 The most important considerations 
were "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department" and "a lack of ju-
dicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
it. ,26 
Applying this new analysis, the Court conceded that the 
voters' challenge, if made under the Guarantee Clause, would 
have raised a political question.27 Nonetheless, it held justiciable 
the identical claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause.28 
Justice Brennan's entire substantive analysis of this provision 
consisted of one sentence: "Judicial standards under the Equal 
20. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
21. Id at 187-95. 
22. Id at 210. 
23. Id at 226. 
24. Id at 231-37. 
25. Id at 211. 
26. Id. at 217. 
27. Id at 209-10,217-29. 
28. Id at 208-37; see also id at 227-29 (concluding that the equal protection com-
plaint was not so enmeshed with the Republican Form of ~~ve~e?t claim as to make 
the question presented "political"). Although couched m JUnsdictiOnal language, the 
majority's opinion clearly indicates its belief that the Tennessee apportionment statute 
was unconstitutional, as subsequent decisions would confirm. 
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Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has 
been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, 
that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and 
capricious action. "29 
In his concurrence, Justice Clark lamented the majority's 
decision to rest its ruling on jurisdictional grounds and its 
"fail[ ure] to give the District Court any guidance whatever. "30 
Instead, he would have held on the merits that the apportion-
ment statute violated equal protection because Tennessee did 
not offer any "rational basis" for it.31 Justice Clark stressed that 
federal court adjudication was the only practical remedy because 
other political channels were unavailable.32 Finally, he argued 
that the Court should have fashioned a specific remedy with a 
rational districting plan, because otherwise the district judge 
might simply declare a constitutional violation in the hope of 
"blackjacking" the state legislature into acting.33 
In dissent, Justice Frankfurter assailed the majority for re-
versing the uniform precedent holding apportionment to be a 
political question, like all Republican Form of Government 
claims.34 He emphasized the Court's traditional unwillingness to 
interfere with state governments, absent violation of an explicit, 
judicially enforceable constitutional command (such as the pro-
hibition against racial discrimination).35 
Justice Frankfurter asserted that plaintiffs had tendered a 
Guarantee Clause claim "masquerading under [the] different la-
bel"36 of an individual equal protection complaint that their 
"right to vote and to have their votes counted" had been in-
29. Id at 226. 
30. Id at 251 (Clark, J., concurring). 
31. Id at 253-59. 
32. As the entrenched rural legislators would not voluntarily change a districting 
scheme that maximized their power by diluting the electoral strength of urban areas, the 
ordinary political remedy of voting was ineffective. See id. at 259. Similarly, since only 
the Assembly could initiate an amendment to the state Constitution, that route was 
closed. Id. Moreover, Tennessee had no initiative or referendum procedure, and its 
courts refused to consider the voters' claims. Id. Finally, Congress had not stepped in to 
rectify the problem. Id.; see also id at 248-49 (Douglas, J., concurring) (deeming relief 
through the political process "illusory"). 
33. Id. at 260 (Clark, J., concurring); see also id at 250-51 n.5 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (agreeing that federal court rulings might induce legislatures to reapportion, but 
viewing this prospect as beneficial). 
34. Id. at 266-67,277-80, 289-97 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
35. Id. at 267,284-86. 
36. I d. at 297. 
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fringed?7 Regardless of label, however, apportionment involved 
multiple policy factors-such as geography, demographics, so-
cioeconomics, convenience, traditions, and mathematical formu-
las-which could properly be weighed only by state officials?8 In 
Frankfurter's view, the Equal Protection Clause provided no 
more judicial guidance to review such decisions than did the Re-
publican Form of Government Clause.39 Nothing in the Equal 
Protection Clause (or any other constitutional provision) re-
quired states to base representation solely on population; in-
deed, no such principle was applied at the time of the Framing, 
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, or thereafter.40 
Justice Frankfurter predicted that Baker would "add a viru-
lent source of friction and tension in federal-state relations"41 by 
empowering federal judges "to devise what should constitute the 
proper composition of the legislatures of the fifty States."42 He 
warned: 
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the 
Court's "judicial Power" not only presages the futility of judi-
cial intervention in the essentially political conflict of forces 
by which the relation between population and representation 
has time out of mind been and now is determined. It may 
well impair the Court's position as the ultimate organ of "the 
supreme Law of the Land" in that vast range of legal prob-
lems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling, on which 
this Court must pronounce. The Court's authority-
possessed of neither the purse nor the sword- ultimately rests 
on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such 
feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detach-
ment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements 
and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of politi-
cal forces in political settlements.43 
37. Id at 299. This "right to have their votes counted" language, which appears in 
almost all the later apportionment cases, uncannily foreshadows Vice President Gore's 
slogan in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), discussed infra notes 133-166 and accompany-
ing text. 
38. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 268-69,323-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
39. ld at 300-01, 322-23. 
40. Id at 301-21; see also id. at 300 ("To find such a political conception legally en-
forceable in the broad and unspecific guarantee of equal protection is to rewrite the Con-
stitution."). 
41. Id at 324. 
42. ld. at 269. 
43. Id at 267; see also id at 270 (urging "a frank acknowledgment that there is not 
under our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political mischief, for every undesir-
able exercise of legislative power"). 
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Finally, Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority for failing to 
provide lower courts with any specific guidance for devising ap-
propriate relief for alleged constitutional violations by states in 
their apportionment statutes.44 
In a separate dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the Equal 
Protection Clause (1) had never before been interpreted as re-
quiring each vote to be given equal weight in choosing state leg-
islatures,45 and (2) did not empower federal courts "to judge 
whether this resolution of the State's internal political conflict 
(distributing electoral units geographically rather than demog-
raphically) is desirable or undesirable, wise or unwise."46 He de-
nied the applicability of the equal protection bar against "arbi-
trary and capricious" classifications, noting that it might well be 
reasonable for a state to promote agricultural interests by giving 
them more electoral strength.47 Justice Harlan further pointed 
out that the only pertinent constitutional limit on states-the 
Guarantee Clause-did not fix any immutable representation 
principle.48 Finally, he rejected the argument that the voters' in-
ability to obtain political redress justified "the Court to stretch to 
find some basis for judicial intervention:"49 
Those observers of the Court who see it primarily as the last 
refuge for the correction of all inequality or injustice, no mat-
ter what its nature or source, will no doubt applaud this deci-
sion and its break with the past. Those who consider that con-
tinuing national respect for the Court's authority depends in 
large measure upon its wise exercise of self-restraint and dis-
cipline in constitutional adjudication will view the decision 
with deep concern.50 
44. Id at 267-68, 327-28. He especially deplored the contention that federal judicial 
remedies might be obviated "once the abstract constitutional right to have courts pass on 
a state-wide system of electoral districting is recognized as a matter of judicial rhetoric, 
because legislatures would heed the Court's admonition." Id at 269; see also id at 339 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (condemning, as an illegitimate use of Article III power, the no-
tion that the mere assertion of jurisdiction would induce malapportioned states to 
"quickly respond with appropriate political action"). 
45. Id at 332, 338-39 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id at 333 (stressing that the 
Senate belied any broader claim that the Constitution requires representation to be 
based exclusively on population). 
46. Id. at 333; see also id. at 332 (counseling deference to "the judgment of state 
legislatures and courts on matters of basically local concern"). 
47. Id at 334-36. 
48. Id at 333-34. 
49. Id. at 339. 
50. Id at 339-40. 
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C. THE AFTERMATH OF BAKER 
1. The Immediate Scholarly Reaction 
As Justice Harlan predicted, Baker produced a mixed re-
sponse.51 On one side, Thomas Emerson, Charles Black, Robert 
McKay, Louis Pollak and others praised the Court for interven-
ing because it represented the only realistic hope for remedying 
injustices in apportionment.52 These scholars deemed popula-
tion equality in electoral districts a fundamental constitutional 
value, even if it had never before been recognized.53 They de-
nied the need for any "precise or absolute" standards under the 
Equal Protection Clause and instead urged case-by-case doc-
trinal development.54 To them, Baker "mark[ed] a momentous 
51. In this Article, I focus on the long-ignored essays published shortly after Baker 
and related apportionment decisions had been rendered, because that work is most rele-
vant in drawing comparisons with the commentary that has been written in the immedi· 
ate wake of Bush, described infra Part II.B. I do not purport to analyze all of the litera-
ture dealing with the constitutional law governing elections. 
52. See Thomas I. Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 Yale L.J. 64, 
79-80 (1962) (maintaining that federal courts alone possessed the independence to re-
solve this problem rationally, because malapportionment had blocked the majority's abil-
ity to change the law through ordinary democratic processes). For similar arguments, see 
Charles L. Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v. 
Green, 72 Yale L.J. 13, 14 (1962); Robert B. McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: 
Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 645, 647, 678-80 (1963); Louis 
H. Pollak, Judicial Power and "The Politics of the People," 72 Yale L.J. 81, 88 (1962); see 
also Carl A. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, 
One Value, 1964 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 2 ("[I]t is ... paradoxical for the advocates of judicial self-
limitation to criticize the Court for helping to make majority nile effective, because the 
case for self-restraint rests on the assumption that the Court is reviewing the legislative 
acts of representatives who are put in office and can be turned out of office by a majority 
of the people."). 
53. See, e.g., Auerbach, 1964 S. Ct. Rev. at 22-23 (cited in note 52); see also Black, 
72 Yale L.J. at 14-18 (cited in note 52) (decrying the notion that judicial wisdom in con-
stitutional adjudication always requires self-restraint, especially where the critical right to 
equal treatment in voting was at stake); Emerson, 72 Yale L.J. at 79 (cited in note 52) 
(lauding the majority for "abruptly reversing the whole position of the Court on a vital 
and fundamental issue," electoral fairness); McKay, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 650-51, 654, 677-
78, 681-82, 690-91, 694-95,705-06 (cited in note 52) (emphasizing that the Court's failure 
to decide important constitutional issues may also weaken its prestige, and claiming that 
apportionment clearly implicates the basic civil right of the franchise); Pollak, 72 Yale 
L.J. at 82-83, 87-88 (cited in note 52) (asserting that the Court correctly rejected the idea 
of judicial restraint embraced in Colegrove and its progeny, which had tolerated gross 
inequities in apportionment). 
54. See Black, 72 Yale L.J. at 17 (cited in note 52) (making this point and suggest-
ing that federal courts determine the reasonableness of various departures from the ideal 
of equality based on population, such as geographical.con~id~rations); id at 18 (charac-
terizing constitutional law as "not merely a set of static pnnc1ples but a process, even a 
quest"); Emerson, 72 Yale L.J. at 65, 70-74 (cited in note 52) (arguing that equal protec-
tion standards could only be worked out with great difficulty in common-law fashion, and 
recommending that the Court treat as "invidious discrimination" any factors unrelated to 
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step forward in utilizing law ... for the maintenance and invigo-
ration of the democratic structure of our society and in the as-
sumption of a positive role by the Supreme Court in that task."55 
On the other side, Alexander Bickel,56 Stanley Friedel-
baum,57 Jerold Israel,58 Jo Desha Lucas,59 Robert McCloskey,60 
Phil Neal,61 and Allan Sindler62 decried the Baker majority's fail-
population that unduly subordinate the basic right to vote, such as wealth-based classifi-
cations); McKay, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 650-51, 659-60, 664-65, 681-700 (cited in note 52) 
(deeming case-by-case development both prudent and routine in constitutional law, and 
endorsing an approach similar to that of Professors Black and Emerson). 
55. Emerson, 72 Yale L.J. at 79 (cited in note 52); see also id at 64, 68, 79-80 (exalt-
ing the Court for promoting democratic ideals and procedures in election laws). For 
similar sentiments, see Black, 72 Yale L.J. at 14-15 (cited in note 52); McKay, 61 Mich. L. 
Rev. at 645-46,650-51 (cited in note 52); Pollak, 72 Yale L.J. at 82-83, 87-89 (cited in note 
52). 
56. Alexander M. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 Yale L.J. 39 
(1962). Bickel conceded the legal validity of two aspects of Baker. First, the Constitu-
tion's grant to Congress of power to regulate elections, both federal (under Article I, Sec-
tion 4) and state (under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments), should not be in-
terpreted as foreclosing the exercise of Article III authority to review constitutional 
challenges to the electoral process. Id at 39-40, 44 (illustrating this point by citing the 
Court's intervention in electoral decisions based upon race, and noting that Colegrove 
did not hold to the contrary); see also Black, 72 Yale L.J. at 21-22 (cited in note 52); Pol-
lak, 72 Yale L.J. at 83-84 (cited in note 52). Second, Bickel admitted that possible diffi-
culties in enforcing decrees did not justify declining jurisdiction. Bickel, 72 Yale L.J. at 
40 (invoking Brown to support this proposition). Nonetheless, he concluded that a dif-
ferent problem warranted such abstention: The Court could not devise principled legal 
standards to determine the validity of apportionment statutes. Id. at 40-45. 
57. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of Judicial Interven-
tion and its Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 673 (1962) (recom-
mending that federal courts, to preserve federalism, should abstain until states had the 
opportunity to change their apportionment statutes through democratic processes (if 
available) and state courts had reviewed their constitutionality). 
58. Jerold Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The 
Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 107 (1962) (questioning the Court's ability to 
develop and apply workable equal protection principles). 
59. Jo Desha Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative Government: 
The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 711 (1963) (charging the majority with 
imposing their political and moral views by twisting the Constitution's language, history, 
and precedent). 
60. Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term-Foreword: The Reap-
portionment Case, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 54 (1962) (arguing that the Court should limit judicial 
review of state apportionment laws to the procedural inquiry of whether they had been 
passed through open channels for expressing popular consent, rather than trying to de-
velop and apply practical and apolitical substantive constitutional standards). This idea 
received full development in John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard U. Press, 
1980), discussed infra notes 120, 123-124 and accompanying text. 
61. Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. 252, 253 
(Baker featured "an abrupt reversal of position, unexplored and debatable substantive 
principles, and the contemplation of remedies as novel as they are drastic."). 
62. Allan P. Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How to "Sear the Conscience" of Legislators, 72 
Yale L.J. 23, 28-38 (1962) (contending that Baker's suggestion that the Equal Protection 
Clause required voting equality based exclusively upon population had no basis in law or 
history). 
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ure to specify any governing legal principles-and argued that 
attempting to do so would be futile because every apportion-
ment law had evolved through a complex political process that 
balanced many factors.63 Thus, state governments represented 
not only individuals but also competing interest groups through 
mechanisms like bicameralism and geographical districting (of-
ten via existing subdivisions such as counties), which reflected 
considerations both socioeconomic (e.g., a desire to ensure rep-
resentation for minority groups) and political (e.g., the wish to 
maintain a viable two-party system).64 Accordingly, these critics 
argued that neither our general constitutional traditions nor the 
specific language, history, or precedent of the Equal Protection 
Clause justified a simplistic apportionment standard of "rational-
ity" based upon numerical equality of population.65 Indeed, they 
noted that it was precisely this inability to formulate and apply 
workable constitutional principles, as well as federalism con-
cerns, that had always led the Court to refuse to interfere with 
state electoral matters based on general allegations of unfairness 
or unreasonableness.66 
63. See Bickel, 72 Yale L.J. at 42-45 (cited in note 56); Friedelbaum, 29 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. at 692-93,698 (cited in note 57); Israel, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 108-13 (cited in note 58); 
Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 750-51, 756, 764-73 (cited in note 59); McCloskey, 76 Harv. L. 
Rev. at 55, 63, 71-73 (cited in note 60); Neal, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. at 253, 267, 274, 284-86, 
289-90 (cited in note 61); Sindler, 72 Yale L.J. at 30 (cited in note 62). 
64. For elaborations of this theme, see Bickel, 72 Yale L.J. at 40-43 (cited in note 
56); Israel, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 124, 130-34 (cited in note 58); Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 
764-76 (cited in note 59); McCloskey, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 71-73 (cited in note 60); Neal, 
1962 S. Ct. Rev. at 275-83 (cited in note 61); Sindler, 72 Yale L.J. at 29-30, 38 (cited in 
note 62). 
65. "(J)udicial adherence to the single standard of equal-population representation 
would constitute an arbitrary choice justified neither by law, nor history, nor logic." Sin-
dler, 72 Yale L.J. at 33 (cited in note 62). For similar conclusions, see Bickel, 72 Yale L.J. 
at 40-41 (cited in note 56); Israel, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 130-34 (cited in note 58); Lucas, 61 
Mich. L. Rev. at 769-75, 802-04 (cited in note 59); McOoskey, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 71-73 
(cited in note 60); Neal, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. at 275,279-80,284-86,326 (cited in note 61). 
66. See, e.g., Friedelbaum, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 673-88,691 (cited in note 57) (argu-
ing that Baker should have been controlled by the fifteen apportionment decisions over 
the previous thirty years, all of which had dismissed constitutional challenges). Professor 
Lucas demonstrated that Justice Brennan's attempt to distinguish these cases was inaccu-
rate and misleading. Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 711-48, 751-52, 803 (cited in note 59). 
Recognizing that the Court had reached the merits in a few of these decisions, however, 
he conceded that legislative districting did not necessarily fall outside federal jurisdiction 
or raise political questions. Id. at 713-14. Nonetheless, Lucas concluded that prior judi-
cial rulings that apportionment raised "nonjusticiable" issues under the Guarantee 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment actually reflected substantive determinations 
that those constitutional provisions did not confer individual legal rights. Id at 754-55; 
see also Israel, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 136-37, 143 (cited in note 58) (asserting that any 
claims of unfairness in apportionment really implicated whether the state had a republi-
can form of government and therefore were political questions); cf. Arthur Earl Bon-
field, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Govern-
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These scholars acknowledged that Baker had proved very 
popular, especially because Americans had become overwhelm-
ingly non-rural.67 Nonetheless, they warned that the majority's 
refusal to adhere to legal rules and precedent, and their imposi-
tion of their personal notions of fairness and their political 
agenda of reform, would eventually weaken the Court's author-
ity and independence.68 For instance, Robert McCloskey charac-
terized Baker as political fiat and admonished federal judges to 
exercise a recognizably "judicial" function-formulating and 
consistently applying principles rooted in the Constitution's lan-
guage, history, and precedent.69 He argued that public confi-
dence in the Court 
depends heavily on the idea that what judicial review adds to 
the governmental process is significantly different from what 
the political branches contribute. We need not pause now to 
inquire whether or to what degree this idea may be delusion; 
delusion or not, the idea is vital to the Court's position as "the 
ultimate organ of 'the supreme Law of the Land."' If the pub-
lic should ever become convinced that the Court is merely 
another legislature, that judicial review is only a euphemism 
for an additional layer in the legislative process, the Court's 
future as a constitutional tribunal would be cast in grave 
doubt. ... [A] price is paid for each judicial venture into un-
charted and unchartable seas. . . . Each such venture tarnishes 
a little more the idea that the judicial process and the legisla-
ment, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 245 (1962) (arguing that this Clause was justiciable and required, at 
a minimum, that legislatures have at least one chamber selected according to population 
equality, with the other house permitted to reflect factors such as geography but not 
wealth distinctions). 
67. See, e.g., Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 803-04 (cited in note 59); but see Auerbach, 
1964 S. Ct. Rev. at 70-71 (cited in note 52) (suggesting that voting interests did not divide 
neatly into "rural" and "urban" blocs). Others attributed the spirit of compliance with 
Baker as reflecting the Court's articulation of a widely shared ideal. See, e.g., 
McCloskey, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 58-59 (cited in note 60); Emerson, 72 Yale L.J. at 76, 78 
(cited in note 52); McKay, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 645-46 (cited in note 52). 
68. See, e.g., Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 801-04 (cited in note 59); Neal, 1962 S. Ct. 
Rev. at 252-53, 274,326-27 (cited in note 61). In urging the Court to stay out of partisan 
political struggles such as apportionment, Professor Lucas asked: "When courts under-
take to manipulate and control the processes for selection of the politician, what is more 
natural than for the politician to marshal his resources for controlling the selection of the 
judge?" Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 802 (cited in note 59). Bush v. Gore raises that same 
question. 
69. McCloskey, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 67-73 (cited in note 60); see also Neal, 1962 S. 
Ct. Rev. at 327 (cited in note 61) (concluding that Baker exemplifies "the role of fiat in 
the exercise of judicial power" because the Court refused to explain its authority to act, 
the propriety of its involvement in the political arena of apportionment, or its governing 
legal principles). 
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tive process are distinguishable .... [which] is indispensable to 
judicial review.70 
Interestingly, commentators of all political and ideological 
stripes predicted that the Court could not possibly mandate 
equal population as the representation standard.71 The Justices, 
of course, took precisely that tack. 
2. Baker Entrenched 
The Court swiftly transformed Baker's jurisdictional ruling 
into new substantive constitutional law. In 1963, Gray v. Sand-
ers72 struck down Georgia's county-unit method of weighing 
votes in Democratic primary elections for United States Senator 
and statewide offices, which gave rural areas disproportionate 
influence.73 After quickly dismissing justiciability concerns,74 the 
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that, once 
a geographical unit for representation had been designated, all 
those who participated in the election must have an equal vote.75 
Indeed, this principle assertedly resonated throughout American 
history: "The conception of political equality from the Declara-
tion of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the 
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean 
only one thing-one person, one vote."76 
70. McCloskey, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 67 (cited in note 60). 
71. See, e.g., id at 73 (arguing that the Court should not "undertake a Lochner-
esque responsibility for defining the substantive constitutional norm (e.g., 'one man, one 
vote') and for determining whether each departure from the norm is 'rational' or 'capri-
cious'"). For similar concerns about the infeasability of such a rigid standard, see Bickel, 
72 Yale L.J. at 40-42 (cited in note 56); Black, 72 Yale L.J. at 17 (cited in note 52); Emer-
son, 72 Yale L.J. at 71-73 (cited in note 52); Israel, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 130-34 (cited in 
note 58); Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 769-75, 802-04 (cited in note 59); Sindler, 72 Yale 
L.J. at 29-33 (cited in note 62); see also Paul A. Freund, New Vistas in Constitutional 
Law, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 631, 638-39 (1964) (supporting the Baker Court's intervention 
because Tennessee's political process could not resolve the problem, but criticizing "a 
simplistic criterion of one man, one vote .... [as] question-begging in the case of a colle-
gial body to be chosen with a view to balanced representation"). 
72. 372 u.s. 368 (1963). 
73. Id at 370-72, 379. Each citizen's vote counted less and less as the population of 
his county increased; thus, a combination of units from the smallest rural districts gave 
counties having one-third of the total population a clear majority of the county votes. Id 
at 372. 
74. First, the Court found that the plaintiff, a Georgia voter, had standing to sue 
because his right to vote had been impaired. Id at 375. Second, even though the state 
Democratic Committee had voted to hold the 1962 primary election on a popular-vote 
basis, the case was not moot because the law allowed Georgia to revert to the county-unit 
system. Id. at 375-76. 
75. Id. at 379-80. 
76. Id. at 381. 
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But Americans had never accepted this notion of "political 
equality," as Justice Harlan explained.77 Indeed, he contended 
that the Electoral College refuted any such argument and that 
the state's use of similar voting mechanisms could hardly be 
deemed "irrational" under the Equal Protection Clause.78 
Moreover, Justice Harlan emphasized that the Court had re-
jected four previous constitutional challenges to Georgia's sys-
tem.79 Finally, he lamented the Court's continuing entanglement 
in politics, contrary to its hope in Baker that states would re-
structure their electoral systems without the need for further ju-
dicial intervention.80 
Downplaying such concerns, the Court in Wesberry v. Sand-
ers81 held that a Georgia law creating single-member congres-
sional districts with unequal populations violated Article I, Sec-
tion 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he 
House of Representatives shall be ... chosen ... by the People 
of the several States."82 The majority interpreted this language 
as "mean[ing] that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a 
congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. "83 
The Court's historical justification for this principle rested on the 
Convention's decision to apportion Representatives "among the 
several States ... according to their respective Numbers" (em-
bodied in Article I, § 2, Clause 3) and to ensure their election 
"by the People. "84 
77. Id. at 384 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
78. ld at 384-85; see also id. at 388 (documenting that any disparities in the Georgia 
system were akin to those in the Electoral College). As in Baker, a state could reasona-
bly grant disproportionately more seats to agricultural than to urban communities, and 
the Court's decision to judge constitutional rationality based on "pure arithmetic" was 
"judicial fiat." Id at 386-88. The majority rejected the analogy to the Electoral College 
on the ground that the Constitution explicitly authorized its numerical inequality to ad-
dress specific historical concerns. Id. at 378. 
79. See id at 383 (citing Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); South v. Peters, 
339 U.S. 276 (1950); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 
(1958)). Although these four decisions were short per curiam dismissals, the Court had 
given plenary consideration to the same constitutional attack on an Illinois law in Mac-
Dougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948). See Gray, 372 U.S. at 385 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). 
80. Gray, 372 U.S. at 382, 388-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
81. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
82. Id at 7-18. 
83. ld at 7-8. 
84. ld at 11-15. These provisions reflected the wishes of the large states, whereas 
the Senate-composed of two members from each state elected by their legislatures-
satisfied the small states. See id at 11-13 (discussing this "Great Compromise"). The 
Court also cited various historical statements that the House had to reflect the propor-
tionate populations of the states to support the (quite different) proposition that, within 
each state, there had to be equal representation for equal numbers of people. See id. at 
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Justice Harlan, however, asserted that the language of Arti-
cle I and its relevant history were "all in strong and consistent 
direct contradiction of the Court's holding. "85 First of all, he 
faulted the majority for focusing exclusively on the "chosen by 
the People" phrase and ignoring the rest of Clause 1, which con-
fers the right to vote for Representatives only on those people 
whom "the State has found qualified to vote for members of ... 
the State Legislature."86 Indeed, every state since 1789 had set 
qualifications for voting (e.g., property ownership), just as the 
Framers intended.87 
Furthermore, Justice Harlan pointed out that Section 2, 
Clause 3 simply provides for apportionment of Representatives 
"among the several States" based on their populations, but does 
not deal with how Representatives would be chosen within each 
state.88 Finally, he emphasized that the only constitutional provi-
sion that covers districting within a state is Section 4 of Article I: 
"The Times, Places, and Manner of holding [congressional] Elec-
tions . . . shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter 
such Regulations."89 By Justice Harlan's lights, Section 4 placed 
no restrictions on this power and did not mention-much less 
mandate-equal representation in districting.90 In fact, he 
showed that the entire history of the drafting, ratification, and 
implementation of Section 4 revealed that only Congress-not 
federal courts-had authority to review the states' exercise of 
their power to select their Representatives according to any 
method of popular election they chose.91 Justice Harlan accused 
8-18. 
85. lei at 41-42 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
86. ld. at 25. 
87. ld. at 25-27 n.7; see also iei at 30-31 (demonstrating that even those Convention 
delegates who favored representation based on population thought that only propertied 
citizens should vote). Thus, Section 2 itself could not possibly prevent a state from ap-
portioning Representatives as it pleased. See id. at 26. 
88. ld. at 27; see also id. at 31-32 (establishing that the Convention debates on this 
clause exclusively concerned how Representatives should be apportioned among, not 
within, the states). Moreover, even among the states, the Framers did not endorse abso-
lute numerical equality, as shown by two provisions in Clause 3. One guaranteed each 
state a Representative regardless of population. ld. at 28-29 (illustrating this point by 
noting that sparsely populated states like Wyoming have one Representative, even 
though their population is significantly Jess than that of the average congressional district 
within other states). The second provision counted three-fifths of slaves in their state's 
representation, thereby giving Southern states representation far in excess of their voting 
population. lei at 27. 
89. ld. at 29. 
90. ld. at 29-30. 
91. Id. at 23-24, 29-30, 32-42 (citing uncontested statements by Madison, Wilson, 
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his colleagues of substituting their judgment about sound politi-
cal principles for that of Congress, thereby upsetting the consti-
tutional separation of powers.92 He asserted that the Justices 
had weakened the political process by imposing their political 
theory of selecting Representatives on the states and Congress 
"for no reason other than that it seems wise to the majority of 
the present Court. "93 
Justice Harlan concluded that (1) all the historical evidence 
confirmed his straightforward interpretation of Article I, and (2) 
no one had ever before suggested that Section 2's "by the Peo-
ple" language created a "one person, one vote" principle that re-
stricted the Section 4 power of either the states or Congress.94 
Hence, he alleged that "[t]he constitutional right which the 
Court create[ d] [was] manufactured out of whole cloth. "95 
Although Justice Stewart believed that Harlan had "unan-
swerably demonstrated" the incorrectness of Wesberry's hold-
ing,96 the Court quickly extended it to state legislatures in Rey-
nolds v. Sims.97 After finding justiciable a challenge by Alabama 
voters to the malapportionment of their legislature98 and deter-
mining that they had no effective political remedy ,99 the Court 
declared: "the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportu-
nity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state 
Hamilton, and others). Congress had always exercised plenary power to supervise state 
laws governing the manner of congressional elections. As the Court had previously rec-
ognized, in 1929 Congress deleted-and repeatedly refused to reinstate-its 1872 statu-
tory provision requiring that Representatives "be elected by districts ... containing as 
nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants." Id at 42-44 (citing relevant 
precedent and legislation). 
Despite this evidence, the majority held that Section 4 did not immunize state or 
congressional apportionment decisions from judicial review. ld at 5-7 (citing Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186,232 (1962)). 
92. See id at 22, 48 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
93. ld at 30; see also id at 48 (emphasizing that reliance on the Court to spearhead 
political reform would weaken the political process). 
94. ld. at 30-42. 
95. ld at 42 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
96. Id at 50-51 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Harlan's substantive 
analysis of Article I, but deeming the case justiciable). 
97. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
98. ld at 537-59. Congress's admission into the Union of states with apportionment 
plans not based on population (and thus its judgment that such states had a Republican 
Form of Government) did not prevent the Court from determining whether such 
schemes violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id at 582. 
99. The Court undercut its own conclusion by conceding that Alabama (unlike 
Tennessee) had a constitutional amendment process, and that indeed its voters had re-
jected an amendment proposing greater representation in one legislative house based 
upon population. Id. at 553-54, 570. 
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legislators."100 Accordingly, representation in both houses had 
to be based on population, not place of residence, geography, 
economic interests, or historical practice.101 The Court distin-
guished the Constitution's congressional system of representa-
tion as reflecting an essential compromise among sovereign 
states-a unique circumstance without relevance to state legisla-
tive districting schemes.102 Borrowing Wesberry's "as nearly as is 
practicable" qualifier, however, the Court announced it would 
permit minor deviations from the equal-population principle 
when incidental to effectuating a rational state policy, such as 
ensuring some voice to political subdivisions (but not geographi-
cal considerations alone, economic interests, or historical pat-
terns).103 
Justices Clark and Stewart, concurring, would have held 
that Alabama's sixty-year old apportionment plan was plainly 
irrational under the Equal Protection Clause.104 They faulted the 
majority for elaborating legal standards based on "meaningless 
phrases. "105 
In a five-part argument, Justice Harlan assailed the Court 
for spouting "generalities" that totally ignored the Fourteenth 
Amendment's language, drafting and ratification process, im-
plementing history, and precedent.106 First, the Court's interpre-
tation of the phrase "equal protection" in Section 1 (the lone 
provision it considered) was refuted by Section 2, which explic-
itly recognized the states' power to "deny" or "abridge" the right 
100. Id at 566. 
101. Id at 561-76; see also id at 568 (arguing that "equal protection" meant "sub-
stantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens" because legislators repre-
sented people, not areas or group interests). 
102. Id at 571-75. 
103. Id at 577-81. 
104. See id. at 587-88 (Clark, J., concurring); id at 588-89 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
105. See, e.g., id at 587-88 (Clark, J., concurring) ("Whether 'nearly as is practicable' 
means 'one person, one vote' qualified by 'approximately equal' or 'some deviations' or 
by the impossibility of 'mathematical nicety' is not clear from the majority's use of these 
vague and meaningless phrases."); see also id at 588-89 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
In a companion case, both of these Justices (along with Harlan) dissented from the 
majority's invalidation of Colorado's apportionment law because that state had ensured 
equality in its House and had rationally based representation in its Senate on a combina-
tion of factors such as population, its mountainous geography, and economic considera-
tions. Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 741-44 (1964) (Clark, J., dissent-
ing); id at 744-65 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
106. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589-625 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending that this evi-
dence demonstrated that states (1) could choose any method they wished for apportion-
ing their legislatures and (2) did not have to ensure that all legislators represented sub-
stantially the same number of people). 
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to vote.107 Second, the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment revealed Congress's deliberate refusal to impose 
any limits on the states' exclusive and plenary power over voting 
rights (including legislative apportionment), because attempting 
to do so would have jeopardized adoption of the Amendment.108 
All the ratifying states also shared this understanding.109 Third, 
after 1868 states routinely exercised their independent power to 
structure their legislatures as they saw fit,110 and as of 1964 the 
constitutions of eighty percent of the states recognized bases of 
apportionment other than population.111 Fourth, the Fifteenth 
and Nineteenth Amendments, which prohibited abridgement of 
the right to suffrage on account of race and gender, would have 
been unnecessary if the Fourteenth Amendment already pro-
tected equality in voting.112 Finally, the Court had silently over-
ruled its pertinent pre-Baker cases, which had uniformly held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer the right either 
to vote or to a state legislature apportioned by population.113 
Justice Harlan contended that the majority was amending 
the Constitution by adding something that had been deliberately 
excluded, not applying general constitutional language to a situa-
tion that had not been contemplated.U4 Thus, he claimed that, as 
in Baker, Gray, and Wesberry, the Court had exceeded its Arti-
cle III authority by imposing its own notions of reform because 
of its impatience with the political processOU5 Moreover, these 
apportionment cases sanctioned intolerable interference with the 
107. ld at 593-94 (noting that Section 2 also set forth a remedy if a state exercised 
this power: reducing that state's basis of representation proportionately to those ex-
cluded). 
108. Id at 595-99 (showing that every Congressman who spoke on this issue held this 
view). 
109. First, most of the "loyal" ratifying states had constitutions that allowed appor-
tionment in at least one legislative chamber to be based on factors other than population, 
and they certainly did not think that ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment voided 
their own constitutions. Id at 602-04. Second, Congress demanded that the ten "recon-
structed" states ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and readmitted those states even 
though their constitutions usually departed from the "equal representation" principle. 
Id at 604-07. 
110. Id at 608-10. 
Ill. Id at 610-11. 
112. Id. at 611-12. 
113. Id at 612-14 (citing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874); Cole-
grove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947)). 
114. ld at 590-91, 608, 625. Therefore, the Court's decision "cannot be excused or 
explained by any concept of 'developing' constitutionalism. It is meaningless to speak of 
constJtutwnal 'development' when both the language and history of the controlling pro-
VISIOns of the ConstitutiOn are wholly ignored." Id at 591. 
115. Id. at 615, 624-25. 
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states by "placing basic aspects of state political systems under 
the pervasive over lordship of the federal judiciary. "116 
These decisions ... cut deeply into the fabric of our federal-
ism .... [T)he aftermath of these cases, however desirable it 
may be thought in itself, will have been achieved at the cost of 
a radical alteration in the relationship between the States and 
the Federal Government, more particularly the Federal Judi-
ciary.117 
3. A Summary of the Apportionment Cases 
Baker and Reynolds created an equal protection require-
ment that state legislatures be apportioned according to equality 
of population. The Court in Gray applied that rule to state rep-
resentation schemes for federal Senate elections, and in Wes-
berry discovered the identical principle in the Article I provi-
sions governing congressional districting.118 Justice Harlan 
argued, however, that these holdings lacked any foundation in 
the Constitution's words, history, or precedent and subverted the 
traditional understanding of the judiciary's proper role in the 
federal system.119 
116. ld. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id at 615-22 (describing how federal 
district courts were pressuring state legislatures to reapportion hastily according to stan· 
dardless political judgments that judges were incompetent to make). 
117. See id at 624 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Samuel Issacharoff, et al., When 
Elections Go Bad: The Law of Democracy and the Presidential Election of 2000 at 45-46 
(Foundation Press, 2001) (describing Reynolds as "one of the most dramatically destabi-
lizing decisions in the Court's history .... [r]equir[ing] the massive and immediate re-
structuring of virtually every State legislature in the country"); but see Auerbach, 1964 S. 
Ct. Rev. at 72-73 (cited in note 52) (arguing that malapportionment also adversely affects 
the federal system by skewing the political parties' selection of congressional candidates 
and national convention delegates, by creating "safe" districts that reinforce Congress's 
seniority system, and by forcing the federal government to deal directly with cities be-
cause states do not effectively represent their interests). 
118. Developed in the context of drawing legislative districts, the principle that all 
voters must have an equal opportunity to participate in elections was swiftly extended to 
qualifications for exercising the franchise. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663,665-70 (1966) (striking down a state's attempt to impose wealth-based clas-
sifications for voting such as poll taxes). 
119. See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: 
Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 209 (1964) (largely 
agreeing with Justice Harlan and contending that the Court's exclusive focus on the nu-
merical equality of each individual vote ignored that representation also involves interest 
groups and political parties); see also Issacharoff, et al., When Elections Go Bad at 46 
(cited in note 117) ("[T]he [apportionment] decisions held that the original constitutional 
structures had to be synthesized with emerging conceptions of democracy that required 
political equality among all voters, a conception that the Court read back into the Four-
teenth Amendment."). 
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Despite its shaky constitutional underpinnings, the Court's 
"one person, one vote" slogan had broad popular appeal. 120 
Within a few years the validity of Baker became widely ac-
cepted, even among scholars who had initially attacked it.121 
Baker and its progeny still lacked any coherent intellectual 
foundation, however.122 
4. Baker Rationalized, Sanitized, and Lionized 
Baker remained a result in search of a rationale until John 
Hart Ely published his influential thesis that judicial review in a 
democracy should be limited to situations where representative 
government cannot be trusted because of failures in the political 
process.123 Hence, Professor Ely endorsed the Baker line of 
cases because "they involve[ d) rights (1) that are essential to the 
democratic process and (2) whose dimensions cannot safely be 
left to our elected representatives, who have an obvious vested 
interest in the status quo." 124 
With rare exceptions,125 writers after Ely have accepted 
Baker's correctness and wisdom.126 Indeed, prominent scholars 
120. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 121 (cited in note 60); see also supra note 67 
and accompanying text (describing the popularity of Baker). When the Court enters the 
political fray, it not surprisingly uses catchy political sound-bites that are easy to under-
stand, like "one person, one vote" or "the right to choose." 
121. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate 
Premises, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 986, 991 (1967) ("At least some of us who shook our heads 
over Baker v. Carr are prepared to admit ... that it has not impaired, indeed that it has 
enhanced, the prestige of the Court."). 
122. An early attempt to build one was William P. Irwin, Representation and Elec-
tion: The Reapponionment Cases in Retrospect, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 729 (1969) (arguing that 
the Court's adoption of an "equal population" standard (1) created a free market for in-
terest representation by eliminating statutory biases favoring particular interests (such as 
farmers and the wealthy), and (2) avoided difficult political questions regarding how leg-
islatures behaved in reconciling various interests). 
123. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 73-183 (cited in note 60). Thus, federal courts 
should correct problems in the process of representation to ensure that ordinary political 
channels of change remain open, rather than second-guess the content of the political 
choices made. Id. 
124. Id. at 117. In fairness to the Court, it did mention in Baker that one impetus for 
its intervention was the unavailability of ordinary political remedies to resolve the 
malapportionment. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (citing the concurring 
opinions of Justices Clark and Douglas). Nonetheless, the majority did not rest their de-
cision on that fact, but rather on the justiciability of a "vote debasement" claim under the 
Equal Protection Clause. And the Warren Court certainly did not follow Professor Ely's 
corollary that the Justices should not disturb substantive policy determinations made by 
political officials elected and operating in an open democratic process. 
125. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec and Stephen B. Presser, The American Constitu-
tional Order: History, Cases, and Philosophy 1288-89 (Anderson Publishing Co., 1998) 
(questioning the Baker Court's abandonment of judicial restraint and its refusal to grant 
states the same political latitude as Congress in having one legislative chamber based on 
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have expended considerable energy in developing theories to 
justify Baker and other Warren Court decisions as grounded in 
constitutional law, not merely liberal politics. 127 For instance, 
Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that the Warren Court illustrates 
the proper judicial role: to interpret the Constitution authorita-
tively by exercising discretion, informed by the Justices' moral 
sensibilities, to give specific meaning to the Constitution's ab-
stract language-an indeterminate, evolutionary, and open-
ended process that strives to identify and preserve society's fun-
damental values.128 He praises Baker as exemplifying this pro-
non-population interests); Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
637, 639-40 (2001) (arguing that Baker "evaded the political question straitjacket ... by 
denying the applicability of a truncated version of the political question doctrine and by 
invoking curiously assumed 'judicial standards that are well developed and familiar,"' but 
that the Court never cogently explained either its discarding of this doctrine or how 
judges could avoid entangling themselves in political disputes); Michael McConnell, The 
Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 Harv. J. L. & Pub. 
Pol. 103 (2000) (asserting that Baker and its progeny adopted a mathematically precise 
"equal population" principle that had no basis in the text or history of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause or in the Constitution's structure, and that application of this rule has had the 
practical effect of allowing entrenched partisan politicians to gerrymander favorable dis-
tricts). 
126. The leading constitutional law treatises and casebooks simply summarize Baker, 
without seriously challenging it. See, e.g., William Cohen and Jonathan D. Varat, Consti-
tutional Law: Cases and Materials 103-05 (Foundation Press, 11th ed. 2001); Gerald Gun-
ther and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 46-54 (Foundation Press, 13th ed. 
1997); Jesse H. Choper, et al., Constitutional Law: Cases-Comments-Questions 36-38 
(West Publishing Co., 9th ed. 2001); Ronald Rotunda and John E. Nowak, 1 Treatise on 
Constitutional Law 314, 564-65 (West Group, 3d ed. 1999); 3 Treatise on Constitutional 
Law at 740-41; Geoffrey R. Stone, eta!., Constitutional Law 112, 120, 123-33, 748 (Little 
Brown & Co., 4th ed. 2001). Baker's "landmark" status has often been duly noted. See 
Laurence Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law 371-72 (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2000); 
see also Paul Brest, et al., Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materi-
als 733 (Aspen Law & Business, 4th ed. 2000) (deeming Baker "canonical"). 
127. For example, Professor Sunstein declares: "[T]he Constitution is law. If the 
Constitution is law, then it stands above politics. All public officials-whether Democ-
ratic, Republican, or something else-must obey. The Constitution does not mean what 
particular people want it to mean; otherwise it would not be law at all." Cass R. Sun-
stein, The Partial Constitution 93 (Harvard U. Press, 1993). But he then adds that "the 
Constitution is often extremely vague" and that "[r]easonable people disagree about 
what it means." Id Sunstein praises the (presumably "reasonable") interpretations of 
the Warren Court as promoting constitutional "ideals" such as equality in voting, privacy 
rights, religious liberty, and freedom from discrimination. Id at 98, 260. See also Robert 
C. Post, Justice William J. Brennan and the Warren Court, 8 Canst. Comm. 11, 14 (1991) 
(citing Baker as "exemplary of the Warren Court's jurisprudence" in reconstructing con-
stitutional law on the basis of individualism and democracy). 
128. Erwin Chemerinsky, Interpreting the Constitution 45-141 (Praeger, 1987). The 
Warren Court embodies Chemerinsky's ideal: 
[O]nly a constitution that evolves by interpretatio~ .can ~dequately protect mi-
norities and safeguard fundamental nghts. A JUdiciary msulated from the po-
litical process is uniquely suited to articulate society's deepest values and apply 
them to protect interests and groups most m need of assistance. The powerful 
in society can succeed in the legislature, but the powerless and unpopular need 
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gressive, nonoriginalist approach: "The reapportionment of state 
legislatures would not have occurred without judicial action, and 
the Court's enforcement of a 'one person/one vote' rule has 
made state legislatures much more responsive and effective in 
dealing with urban problems."129 
Chemerinsky's assessment of Baker expresses the main-
stream academic view. Indeed, as Professors Balkin and Levin-
son have noted, the case has become part of a "constitutional 
canon" that is immune from serious scholarly questioningY0 
Moreover, federal judicial forays into electoral matters have 
become so routine that they attract little controversy. For ex-
ample, in 1992 the Court relied upon Baker and Wesberry in 
unanimously permitting a challenge to Congress's selection of a 
method for apportionment of congressional districts among 
states under Article I, Section 2.131 
The lesson of Baker, then, seems plain. When a majority of 
the Justices perceive a nationwide electoral crisis that admits of 
no easy political solution, they should resolve it by making up 
new equal protection law and by ignoring principles of justicia-
bility, federalism, and stare decisis. Dissenting colleagues and 
commentators may warn that such flagrant political interference 
will undermine the Court's independence and prestige, but such 
judicial protection. The Warren Court's legacy is a lesson of the benefits that 
can result from judicial discretion. No other institution but the Court would 
have desegregated the South ... reapportioned state legislatures ... [and] had 
the courage to uphold the right to reproductive autonomy. 
ld at 127. 
129. Id at 141. Reaching "progressive" policy results apparently outweighs the legal 
shortcomings of Baker that Chemerinsky has identified elsewhere. See Erwin Chemerin-
sky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 119, 125 (Aspen Law & Business, 1997) 
(contending that Justice Brennan's six-factor test for determining political questions was 
"useless" and that he drew "a fatuous distinction" that apportionment was justiciable 
under the Equal Protection Clause but not the Guarantee Clause). 
130. Liberal law professors have placed "the beloved precedents of the beloved 
Warren Court" in a "constitutional canon," so that no respectable theorist can dare sug-
gest that these cases might be normatively incorrect. See J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levin-
son, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 964, 997-1002 (1998). They 
note the "irony" that "it is liberals who defend the [legal] academic theory canon against 
the 'barbarians' on the right," because in every other discipline liberal pragmatists argue 
that "all knowledge is revisable if good enough reasons can be provided." Id at 998. 
131. Dept. of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442,456-59 (1992). In the special con-
text of gerrymandering designed to enhance the voting clout of African Americans, how-
ever, a few Justices have resurrected the Frankfurter/Harlan argument that the Court 
should abstain from second-guessing states' choices in balancing competing political in-
terests in their districting plans. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,918-25 (1996) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). 
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dire predictions will prove groundless. Against this background, 
Bush v. Gore132 seems not only plausible but inevitable. 
II. BUSH v. GORE AND ITS FALLOUT 
A. THECASE 
Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore protested Flor-
ida's determination that Republican George Bush had won its 25 
electoral votes. Gore requested a manual recount in Miami-
Dade, Palm Beach, Broward, and Volusia Counties.133 Overrul-
ing the Florida Secretary of State's order that such recounts had 
to be completed by the statutory deadline of November 14, that 
state's supreme court granted a twelve-day extension.134 Be-
cause of uncertainty over the grounds of that decision, the 
United States Supreme Court vacated.135 
On November 26, Florida's Elections Commission certified 
Bush the winner.136 Gore contested this certification under a 
statute that required him to prove a "rejection of a number of 
legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the 
election. "137 Reversing a trial judge's ruling that Gore had failed 
to meet this burden, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted "le-
gal vote" to mean one that expressed a "clear indication of the 
intent of the voter"138 and ordered (1) a hand recount of 9000 
Miami-Dade ballots with "undervotes" (i.e., those with no ma-
chine-detected vote), (2) inclusion of Miami-Dade's partial 
manual recount, which yielded 168 Gore votes, and (3) the addi-
tion of 215 Gore votes from Palm Beach County, even though 
these results had been submitted after the court's own Novem-
ber 26 deadline.139 Seven U.S. Supreme Court Justices con-
cluded that this order violated the Equal Protection Clause by 
allowing "standardless manual recounts. "140 
132. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
133. Id. at 101. 
134. Id 
135. Id The Florida high court reinstated its judgment on December 11. Id 
136. Id. 
137. Id., citing Fla. Stat. Ann. § 102.168(3)(c). 
138. Id at 102. 
139. Id. 
140. Id at 529. Two Justices agreed with this equal protection holding, but would 
have declined to exercise jurisdiction in the first place. See id at 129, 134 (Souter, J., dis-
senting); id at 551 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Five Justices joined a per curiam opinion. Initially, they re-
affirmed an 1892 case that had construed Article II, Section 1 of 
the Constitution, which provides that " [ e ]ach State shall appoint 
[presidential electors] in such Manner as the Legislature thereof 
may direct,"141 as a grant of plenary authority.142 If a state legis-
lature chose to exercise that appointment power by authorizing 
its citizens to vote, then under Reynolds the Equal Protection 
Clause gave them a fundamental right which could not be vio-
lated by arbitrary or disparate action that valued one person's 
vote over another's.143 
The majority held that Florida's Supreme Court had com-
mitted precisely this violation by failing to specify uniform rules 
to be apglied in determining the general statutory "intent of the 
voter." For instance, the state court included recounts from 
three counties that had used divergent standards, contrary to 
Gray's holding that states cannot disparately treat voters in dif-
ferent counties.145 In fact, "the standards for accepting or reject-
ing contested ballots might vary not only from county to county 
but indeed within a single county from one recount team to an-
other."146 For example, in Miami-Dade three canvassing board 
members applied three different criteria in defining a legal 
vote.147 Even more troubling was the Palm Beach County board, 
which 
changed its evaluative standards during the counting process. 
[It] began ... with a 1990 guideline which precluded counting 
completely attached chads, switched to a rule that considered 
a vote to be legal if any light could be seen through a chad, 
changed back to the 1990 rule, and then abandoned any pre-
141. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 1, cl. 2. 
142 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 
(1892)). 
143. ld at 104-05 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964), discussed supra 
notes 97-117 and accompanying text). 
144. Id at 105-06. Although a state may allow local entities to "develop different 
systems for implementing elections," here a state court with power to establish uniform 
standards ordered a recount but did not ensure equal treatment. Id at 109. To illustrate, 
recounts in three counties extended to all ballots, not just "undervotes." Id at 107. An-
other example was the Florida Supreme Court's allowing partial recount totals from Mi-
ami-Dade County but complete totals from others. Id at 107-08. Moreover, the ad hoc 
counting teams lacked training in handling and interpreting ballots, and observers were 
prohibited from objecting during the recount. Id at 109. 
145. ld at 107 (citing, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), discussed supra 
notes 72-80 and accompanying text). 
146. ld. at 106. 
147. ld 
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tense of a per se rule, only to have a court order that the 
county consider dimpled chads legal.148 
Turning to the remedy, the majority declined to remand for a 
constitutionally proper contest because Florida's Legislature had 
mandated that any contest be completed by December 12-the 
date of the Court's decision.149 The per curiam opinion ended by 
brushing off justiciability concerns: 
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial author-
ity than are the Members of this Court, and none stand more 
in admiration of the Constitution's design to leave the selec-
tion of the President to the people, through their legislatures, 
and to the political sphere. When contending parties invoke 
the process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought 
responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues 
the judicial system has been forced to confront.150 
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, maintained that the Florida Su-
preme Court had also violated Article II.151 In the Chief Jus-
tice's view, his Court had to enforce Article II by determining 
whether the state court had altered its Legislature's directions 
concerning the appointment of electors.152 Here the Florida Su-
preme Court had done so by overriding the Secretary of State's 
reasonable exercise of her delegated statutory discretion (1) to 
enforce the Legislature's deadline for certification and to disre-
gard untimely recounted ballots/53 and (2) to interpret "legal 
vote" as not requiring the counting of improperly marked bal-
lots.154 
148. Id at 106-07. 
149. Id at 110. 
150. Id at 111. 
151. Id at 533-39 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 1, cl. 2, 
which provides that "[e]ach State shall appoint [presidential electors], in such manner as 
the Legislature thereof may direct") (emphasis added). 
152. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111-15 (making this point and stressing that Article II 
created an exception to the usual federalism principle of deference to state judiciaries in 
interpreting their own Jaws). The Constitution thus required the Court "to undertake an 
independent, if still deferential, analysis of state Jaw .... To attach definitive weight to 
the pronouncement of a state court, when the very question at issue is whether the court 
has actually departed from the statutory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility 
to enforce the explicit requirements of Article II." Id at 114-15. 
153. Id at 119-20. Likewise, the state court had no business reviewing the canvass-
ing boards' exercise of their statutory discretion to decide whether or not to count ballots 
received after the deadline. Id at 121-22. Another interpretive problem was that the 
Florida court had "emptie[d] certification of virtually all legal consequence." Id 
154. Id at 118-20 (declaring that the Florida Supreme Court had impermissibly sub-
stituted its "peculiar" interpretation that the statute mandated counting votes that had 
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Four Justices dissented. Justice Breyer chastised the Court 
for unnecessarily becoming entangled in the political process of 
selecting a President, especially since two federal laws left such 
electoral matters to political resolution.155 First, the Twelfth 
Amendment empowers Congress to count electoral votes.156 
Second, an 1887 federal statute authorizes states to attempt to 
settle any electoral disputes (either directly or by delegation to 
courts) and Congress to determine any remaining controver-
sies-including judging the legality of votes-according to speci-
fied rules.157 Justice Breyer declared: 
[I]n this highly politicized matter, the appearance of a split 
decision runs the risk of undermining the public's confidence 
in the Court itself. That confidence is a public treasure .... It 
is a vitally necessary ingredient of any successful effort to pro-
tect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself .... [W]e 
do risk a self-inflicted wound-a wound that may harm not 
just the Court, but the Nation. I fear that in order to bring 
this agonizingly long election process to a definitive conclu-
sion, we have ... [abandoned] self-restraint.158 
Justice Souter echoed these political question concerns and 
also suggested ripeness and mootness problems.159 Moreover, 
Justices Souter and Breyer faulted the majority for second-
guessing the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of its state's 
election law, which they deemed reasonable and not designed to 
change the legislature's commands in violation of Article 11.160 
Both Justices concluded that the Court, having exercised juris-
not been marked according to the clear ballot instructions). The Chief Justice also found 
that the Florida court had jeopardized its Legislature's wish to take advantage of 3 
U.S.C. § 5, which guaranteed finality to a state's slate of electors if they were chosen un-
der statutes enacted before the election and were selected six days before the Electoral 
College met (i.e., by December 12). Id at 113-14, 120-22. 
155. See id at 153-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id at 144 (beginning his opin-
ion by declaring that "(t]he Court was wrong to take this case"). 
156. Id at 153. 
157. Id at 153-58. Moreover, this statute aimed to avoid a repeat of 1876, when 
Congress appointed a commission (including five Justices) to resolve the contested presi-
dential election and Justice Bradley cast the deciding vote, which "embroiled Members 
of the Court in partisan conflict, thereby undermining respect for the judicial process." 
Id at 157. 
158. Id at 157-58. 
159. See id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("If this Court had allowed the State [to 
proceed] .... it is entirely possible that there would ultimately have been no issue requir-
ing our review, and political tension could have worked itself out in the Congress .... "). 
160. See id at 130-33; id at 148-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting). They also argued that 3 
U.S.C. § 5 authorized Congress, not the federal courts, to make the political determina-
tion as to the validity of each state's slate of electors. See id at 130 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing); id at 148-49 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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diction, correctly found an equal protection violation.161 None-
theless, they would have remanded so that the Florida court 
could apply a uniform standard in a recount and determine 
whether this process could be completed by December 18 (when 
the electors were to meet). 162 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg agreed with Souter and 
Breyer that (1) the Court had forsaken its ordinary principles of 
judicial restraint and federalism/63 (2) the Florida Supreme 
Court had reasonably interpreted state law/64 and (3) the rem-
edy of stopping the recounts was improper.165 They broke with 
their seven colleagues, however, in concluding that the Florida 
court's adherence to a general "intent of the voter" standard did 
not constitute an equal protection violation.166 
B. THE REACTION OF THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
In contrast to their generally warm embrace of Baker, law 
professors overwhelmingly excoriated the Court's opinion. In-
deed, about 550 of them signed a full-page ad in the New York 
Times on January 13, 2001, which asserted: 
By stopping the vote count in Florida, the U.S. Supreme 
Court used its power to act as political partisans, not judges of 
a court of law .... By taking power from the voters, the Su-
preme Court has tarnished its own legitimacy. As teachers 
whose lives have been dedicated to the rule of law, we protest. 
161. See id at 133-34 (Souter, J., dissenting); id at 145-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
162. See id. at 133-35 (Souter, J., dissenting); id at 146-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
163. See, e.g., id at 123-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that these principles 
counseled leaving presidential election disputes to the states and Congress). Justice 
Ginsburg echoed these concerns and asserted that Article II did not justify the Court's 
departure from its usual practice, rooted in federalism, of showing extraordinary defer-
ence to state court interpretations of state law, even when federal rights were at stake. 
Id at 135-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
164. See id. at 124, 127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 135-36 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting). Both dismissed the statutory Section 5 argument for the reasons given by Jus-
tices Souter and Breyer. See id at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 143-44 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens accused the majority of challenging the Florida courts' 
"impartiality and capacity," thereby cynically undermining "the Nation's confidence in 
the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law." Id at 128, 129 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). 
165. See id at 126-27; id at 143-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
166. See id at 126-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that the Equal Protection 
Clause did not authorize the Court to question the states' power either to set substantive 
standards for determining whether a vote has been legally cast or to allow counties to 
design their own balloting system, and distinguishing cases finding that votes had been 
weighted unequally); id at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Florida Su-
preme Court's recount order would yield a result as fair as the earlier certification). 
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To take another representative example, Erwin Chemerinsky 
charged that "five conservative Republican justices handed the 
election to the Republican candidate, George W. Bush."167 He 
argued that "haste" had led the majority to disregard various jus-
ticiability doctrines168 and that the Court's decision "had no basis 
in law or fact."169 For instance, the Court failed to explain why 
Florida's intercounty variation in determining which votes 
counted- but not other inconsistencies such as differences in 
voting machines and ballots-violated equal protectionP0 
Chemerinsky also claimed that "the Court offered no persuasive 
rationale for ending the recount."171 Similarly, Bruce Ackerman 
deemed the decision "a blatantly partisan act, without any legal 
basis whatsoever," which "betrayed the nation's trust in the rule 
of law. "172 
Some liberal scholars, however, recognized that hypocrisy 
ran both ways. For example, Sandy Levinson maintained that 
five conservative Republican Justices had engaged in "low" poli-
tics and asked: 
How can one take seriously the majority's claims that their 
award of the presidency to Bush is based on their deep con-
cern for safeguarding the fundamental values of equality? 
This majority has been infamous in recent years for relent-
167. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Self-Inflicted Wound, 2001 Cal. Bus. J. 8. 
168. Id. Specifically, Bush's claim that the proposed recount would lack equality 
could not be properly evaluated until after the recount had been completed and the state 
judges had ruled on his objections; indeed, Bush may have retained his lead, thereby ob· 
viating the need for decision. Id. Moreover, Bush lacked standing because he did not 
allege any individual discrimination against him, but rather raised the equal protection 
claims of Florida voters. ld. Thus, the Court issued an "impermissible advisory opin· 
ion." Id 
169. Id at 9. 
170. ld. Furthermore, Florida (and many other states) did have a uniform stan· 
dard-the intent of the voter-which satisfied equal protection concerns. Id 
171. Id See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1093 (2001) (amplifying the theme that the Court should not have inter· 
vened). 
172. Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, 12 Am. Prospect 48 (Feb. 12, 2001). 
Likewise, Professor Dershowitz accused the majority Justices of rendering a biased po· 
litical decision that contradicted their own previous opinions (and the Court's precedent 
generally) on standing, equal protection, and federalism. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Su-
preme Injustice (Oxford U. Press, 2001). At the same time, however, he praised the War· 
ren Court's expansion of constitutional rights, especially in electoral matters, without 
mentioning that those opinions also ignored the controlling law. See id at 6, 70-71, 89, 
119, 185-86. To his credit, however, Dershowitz acknowledged that liberals had sown the 
seeds of Bush v. Gore through their strategy of resolving political problems (like abor· 
tion) by relying on the Court to create new constitutional rights rather than engaging in 
the political process. Id. at 190-97. 
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lessly defending states' rights against the invocation of na-
tional legal or constitutional norms. 173 
Yet Levinson also noted "[the] tension between the generally 
nationalist, equality-protecting positions taken by the dissenters 
and their esteem in Bush v. Gore for state autonomy and, con-
comitantly, for the different standards being applied in various 
county recounts."174 Professor lssacharoff highlighted similar 
contradictions, but concluded that the Court should not have in-
tervened because (1) government officials elected through a 
properly functioning majoritarian political process could have 
provided redress, and (2) the majority failed to articulate clear 
constitutional principles to support its decision.175 
Conservative commentators such as Robert Bork derided 
Justices like Stevens and Ginsburg for their new-found commit-
ment to federalism and to judicial avoidance of political mo-
rasses, given their record of imposing a liberal agenda instead of 
adhering to legal principles.176 Judge Bork traced this approach 
to the 1950s and 1960s: 
During the era of the Warren Court, the contempt for law and 
the desire to make major policy were so blatant that even the 
court's supporters repeatedly warned that results reached 
with so little respect for craftsmanship and candor made the 
court vulnerable. We have learned that those failings, how-
ever egregious, have not lessened the power of the court to do 
what it wants. There is, unfortunately, no particular reason to 
believe that will change. Indeed, Earl Warren, the exemplar 
of lawless judges, is now celebrated as a great and humane ju-
rist.177 
Bork, however, failed to see Bush v. Gore as part of that Warren 
Court tradition, albeit serving conservative rather than liberal 
political ends. Rather, he claimed that the decision "was a val-
iant effort, legitimate in law, to rein in runaway political passions 
173. Sanford Levinson, The Return of Legal Realism, 272 The Nation 8 (January 8, 
2001). 
174. Id. Perhaps the best example of liberal scholars providing a balanced and nu-
anced appraisal of Bush as an extension of the existing law governing elections, rather 
than as a partisan political decision, is Issacharoff, et al., When Elections Go Bad (cited in 
note 117). 
175. Issacharoff, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 637-41,650-56 (cited in note 125). 
176. Robert H. Bork, Sanctimony Serving Politics: The Florida Fiasco, 19 New Crite-
rion 4, 8-11 (March, 2001) (citing as examples these Justices' opinions on abortion, school 
prayer, gay rights, and single-sex military schools). 
177. ld. at 8. 
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and a lawless state court."178 In Bark's view, however, only the 
concurring Justices identified the proper constitutional ration-
ale-Article II, which applied specifically to presidential elec-
tions.179 He recognized that the equal protection holding 
"raise[ d] serious difficulties" because "similar disparities have 
always existed within states under our semi-chaotic election 
processes .... By raising that [inconsistency] to the level of a 
constitutional violation, the court federalized state election 
laws .... Ironically, several justices known for their concern 
about the independence of the states struck a blow against fed-
eralism."180 Ultimately, however, Bork concluded that the end 
justified the means: "The court's choice was between an inade-
quate majority opinion and permitting the stealing of a presiden-
tial election."181 Like Bork, Judge Posner conceded the weak-
ness of the majority's legal analysis, especially under the Equal 
Protection Clause, but defended the decision as necessary to 
prevent a national crisis.182 Richard Epstein wisely declined to 
endorse the Bark/Posner "constitutional emergency" justifica-
tion.183 Instead, he contended that the sole (and persuasive) 
rationale for the Court's intervention was to preserve the Florida 
Legislature's Article II power to direct the selection of electors, 
which the Florida Supreme Court had usurped through statutory 
"interpretations" that grossly deviated from the written election 
law.184 
In short, the voluminous commentary on Bush v. Gore has 
mirrored the Court's ideological split. These political blinders 
178. Id. at 11. 
179. Id at 5-7. 
180. Id at 5. 
181. Id at 6. 
182 The Triumph of Expedience, Harper's 31, 31-34 (May 2001) ("Triumph"); see 
also Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election 
Dispute and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 S. Ct. Rev. 1. 
183. Professor Dershowitz has provided a convincing response: Resolution of the 
presidential election dispute on nonlegal grounds by the politically unaccountable Jus-
tices represents a greater crisis than its resolution by political officials pursuant to the 
Constitution. See Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice at 89-93, 130 (cited in note 172). He 
stressed that the Justices are not "'self-appointed national saviors' with a roving commis-
sion to save us from ourselves even if we have selected other institutions to do the job." 
Id. at. 90. Dershowitz's argument, however, applies with equal force to Baker and its 
progeny-cases he lauds. See id. at 6, 70-71,89, 119, 185-86. 
184. See Richard A. Epstein, "In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Di-
rect'': The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 613 (2001); cf. Michael 
McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 660-77 
(2001) (maintaining that both the equal protection holding and the concurrence's Article 
II analysis were legally sound, and rejecting the "constitutional crisis" rationale). 
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have caused legal scholars to miss a crucial point: Bush is Baker 
v. Carr in conservative garb. 
III. A COMPARISON OF BAKER AND BUSH 
A. SIMILARITIES 
Baker and Bush are strikingly similar. A majority of Jus-
tices sought to resolve a perceived national electoral crisis that 
seemed insoluble by ordinary political means. In both cases, the 
Court abandoned the constraints of justiciability, federalism, and 
equal protection law and precedent.185 Finally, both decisions 
featured acidic dissents containing nearly identical rhetoric. In 
Baker, Justice Frankfurter feared that the majority's 
[ d]isregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the 
Court's "judicial Power" .... may well impair the Court's .... 
authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-
[which] ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its 
moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the 
Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from 
political entanglements and by abstention from injectin~ itself 
into the clash of political forces in political settlements.1 
In Bush, Justice Breyer cited Frankfurter's disciple Alexander 
Bickel in arguing that the majority's decision 
runs the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the 
Court itself. That confidence is a public treasure .... It is a vi-
tally necessary ingredient of any successful effort to protect 
basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself .... [W]e do 
risk a self-inflicted wound-a wound that may harm not just 
the Court~ but the Nation. [W]e have ... [abandoned] self-
restraint.1~7 
Because Baker and Bush are cut from the same cloth, I re-
ject the current liberal orthodoxy, which canonizes Baker and 
demonizes Bush. Nor can I agree with conservatives who ap-
plaud Bush while decrying the political excesses of the Warren 
Court that Baker epitomizes. Rather, I submit that true respect 
185. See supra notes 20-71 and accompanying text (summarizing and criticizing 
Baker); supra notes 133-184 and accompanying text (examining Bush). 
186. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
187. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157-58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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for the rule of law com~els the conclusion that both decisions 
were normatively wrong. 88 
Baker lacked support in the Constitution's text, history, and 
precedent. For several decades, the Court had dismissed all con-
stitutional challenges to state apportionments on two alternative 
grounds: nonjusticiability under the Republican Form of Gov-
ernment Clause or equitable principles rooted in federalism. 
Furthermore, the Court had consistently interpreted the Equal 
Protection Clause as safeguarding the civil rights of individuals 
and minority ~roups, not the general political (i.e., voting) rights 
of majorities. 89 More specifically, the Court had never sug-
gested that equal protection requires representation based ex-
clusively upon population, because doing so would have contra-
dicted both the understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
framers and ratifiers and America's practice since 1789. Justice 
Brennan simply whitewashed these seemingly insuperable politi-
cal question and equal protection problems. 
Instead, the Baker Court should have conceded that the ur-
ban voters' allegation-that Tennessee's apportionment statute 
overweighted rural votes-did not implicate equal protection, 
but rather the guarantee to each state of a Republican Form of 
Government.190 Justice Brennan then should have acknowl-
edged that Luther v. Borden191 did not hold all Guarantee Clause 
complaints to be nonjusticiable, that the Court adjudicated many 
such claims until 1912, and that for fifty years it had miscon-
strued Luther and its progeny as creating a blanket political 
question bar.192 
As in the Luther line of cases, however, the Court should 
have interpreted the Guarantee Clause with extraordinary def-
erence to the political branches, who have primary responsibility 
for enforcing its provisions and should not be second-guessed 
except in the most egregious cases (such as approval of a state's 
188. It would also be intellectually consistent to contend that both decisions were 
correct. I will leave that argument to someone else. 
189. Akhil R. Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular 
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 749, 753-
54 (1994). 
190. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 122 (cited in note 60). See also McConnell, 
24 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy at 113-16 (cited in note 125) (arguing that the Court should 
~val~ate electoral districting based upon the Guarantee Clause and accordingly should 
mvahdate schemes that systemically prevent effective majority rule, as Tennessee's did). 
191. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
192. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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establishment of martial law).193 The Court therefore should 
have respected the conclusion of Congress and the President 
that state apportionment schemes based on interest-group and 
geographical representation (e.g., favoring agricultural over ur-
ban areas) did not render their governments nonrepublican.194 
Although a "democratic" government might require representa-
tion based on equal population, a "republican" government does 
not, as the Senate and the Electoral College illustrate.195 
In a nutshell, a Supreme Court disciplined by law would 
have rejected the constitutional claims presented in Baker. The 
same goes for Bush v. Gore. 
The justiciability barriers in Bush were at least as formida-
ble as those in Baker. As Bush was not a Florida voter, it is un-
clear why he had standing to allege that Florida's differential 
vote-counting standards violated his individual equal protection 
rights.196 Moreover, the Constitution and implementing congres-
sional legislation contemplate political rather than judicial reso-
lution of disputes over presidential elections.197 Initially, at the 
193. In Luther, the Court concluded that Rhode Island's temporary imposition of 
martial law had not violated the Republican Form of Government Clause, but suggested 
that permanent martial law would. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 45. Presumably, the Court could 
also invalidate as "nonrepublican" state attempts to set up a monarchy or a theocracy-
possibilities seen as realistic at the time Article IV was ratified. 
194. See supra notes 38-42,45-50,63-66 and accompanying text. 
195. See supra notes 40, 45-48, 65-66 and accompanying text. 
196. See, e.g., Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice at 77-81 (cited in note 172) (providing a 
detailed analysis of standing); Chemerinsky, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1097-1102 (cited 
in note 171); see also United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742-47 (1995) (holding that 
Louisiana voters who did not live in a congressional district that they alleged had been 
racially gerrymandered lacked the individualized harm required for standing); Robert J. 
Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 393, 472-90 (1996) (endorsing the Court's bedrock requirement that a plain-
tiff must show a personalized injury in order to challenge a constitutional provision like 
the Equal Protection Clause that protects individual rights). Third parties do not have 
standing to raise the claims of others, absent certain extraordinary circumstances (e.g., 
where the third party either lacks the ability to sue or enjoys a uniquely close relationship 
with the plaintiff). See Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts 79-82 (West Publish-
ing Co., 5th ed. 1994) (describing the relevant cases). None of these exceptions applied 
to the relationship between Bush and the Florida voters. 
197. See supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text. The Twelfth Amendment pro-
vides that the Vice President "shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives, open all the certificates [transmitted by the state electors] and the votes shall 
then be counted." It is not clear whether the Vice President or Congress should do the 
counting, although the latter has assumed this function. Furthermore, the Amendment 
could be read as imposing a mere nondiscretionary clerical responsibility to count the 
votes. 
Nonetheless, Congress has long construed this Amendment, in conjunction with the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, as authorizing it to regulate such details as the electors' 
performance of their duties and the procedures for election contests. See James C. 
Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27 
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state level, courts (as in Florida) usually have statutory jurisdic-
tion over such controversies, and Article II arguably gives each 
Legislature power to review such judicial decisions and to ap-
point its own electors if it concludes that the courts ignored its 
pre-election statutory directives.198 Next, Congress ultimately 
counts (and hence determines the validity of) each state's elec-
toral votes.199 
These layers of political scrutiny implicate three justiciabil-
ity doctrines. First, as Bush did not exhaust his remedies in Flor-
ida or in Congress, his claim did not seem ripe for review.200 
Second, success in either of these venues would have mooted his 
case.201 Third, under the political question doctrine, the Consti-
L. & Contemp. Probs. 495, 498-500 (1962) (citing the relevant constitutional and statu-
tory provisions). This settled practice reflects a reasonable, albeit not inevitable, inter-
pretation of the Constitution. 
198. Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 authorizes the "Legislature" of "(e]ach State" to 
direct the "Manner" of "appoint[ing] ... electors." Quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 
U.S. 1, 35 (1892), the Court interpreted this provision as a grant of "plenary power" 
which could be exercised at any time. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). Hence, the 
Florida Legislature may have had the authority to review its judiciary's decisions regard-
ing the presidential election to ensure fidelity to its statutory commands, wholly inde-
pendent of the United States Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over the same sub-
ject matter. See, e.g., John Yoo, A Legislature's Duty, Wall S. J. A24 (Dec. 4, 2000) 
(arguing that the Florida Legislature had the power and duty to appoint its state's 25 
electors directly). 
The majority's emphatic reaffirmation of McPherson is odd because its central 
premise-that the Constitution grants state legislatures absolute control over the selec-
tion of electors-has been undercut by Baker and its progeny, which limited state legisla-
tures' power over apportionment that the Constitution seemed to make every bit as ple-
nary as their power over presidential electors. See supra notes 20-50, 72-122 and 
accompanying text. The Warren Court justified such restrictions by articulating a meta-
constitutional principle (found in Article I, § 2 and in the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seven-
teenth, and Nineteenth Amendments) that our democracy requires representation based 
on the equally weighted vote of each citizen. That precept cannot easily be reconciled 
with the Bush Court's recognition of a state legislature's authority to appoint presidential 
electors itself. See Issacharoff, et a!., When Elections Go Bad at 105-06 (cited in note 
117) (noting this tension). 
199. See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text. 
200. See Pushaw, 81 Cornell L. Rev. at 493-97 (cited in note 196) (examining cases 
and scholarship on ripeness). Concededly, ripeness turns largely on a discretionary de-
termination concerning "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to 
the parties of withholding court consideration." Abbon Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 
148-49 (1%7). The Justices might have concluded that this test had been met. First, the 
constitutional legal questions may have been deemed suitable for immediate decision 
because the Florida Supreme Court had issued its final interpretation of its state's law. 
Second, delay may have caused hardship by allowing the recount to continue and the 
winner to be announced, only to have the Court invalidate the outcome-or perhaps not 
to have had enough time to issue a judgment at all, given the tight deadlines for selecting 
presidential electors (with December 18 as the drop-dead date for ensuring that Congress 
would count Florida's electoral votes). Unfortunately, the Court did not explain why it 
found the case to be ripe. 
201. See Pushaw, 81 Cornell L. Rev. at 490-93 (cited in note 196) (analyzing moot-
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tution could have been interpreted as committing to Congress 
final authority to decide election disputes.202 The Court thus had 
multiple grounds for declining judicial review, at least until the 
political process had run its course.203 
Even putting aside these justiciability concerns, nothing in 
the Equal Protection Clause's language, history, or precedent 
prohibited inconsistencies within states in counting votes.204 The 
ness). Obviously, the possibility that an action may become moot (which always exists) 
does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Justices undoubtedly knew 
that the Florida Legislature had announced its intention to name its slate of electors for 
Bush, which would have mooted the case (although Gore might then have sued to chal-
lenge the Legislature's authority to act unilaterally). Conversely, unexpected failure in 
Florida (or in Congress) would have kept Bush's claims alive. He may have lost the op-
portunity to have them adjudicated, however, if Congress had rejected his arguments at a 
date too late to have permitted the Court to decide. 
202. See, e.g., lssacharoff, et al., When Elections Go Bad at 61-62 (cited in note 117); 
Chemerinsky, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1105-09 (cited in note 171). Admittedly, Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1%2), created a discretionary multi-factor test which brought many 
previously "political" questions within the purview of judicial review. See supra notes 
25-26 and accompanying text (outlining Baker's new approach); see also Pushaw, 81 
Cornell L. Rev. at 498-99 (cited in note 1%) (summarizing the post-Baker political ques-
tion cases). 
The Court, however, could have declined jurisdiction based on almost any of the 
Baker criteria, such as "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue 
to a coordinate political department." Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. An essay written long be-
fore Bush, and thus unbiased by political preferences, supports this conclusion. Albert J. 
Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 26-
30 (1968) (arguing that the Court would likely apply Baker to rule that the Twelfth 
Amendment grants to Congress fmal power to resolve disputes concerning presidential 
electoral voting). 
203. Cf. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993) (reaffirming that federal judges gener-
ally should defer their consideration until state proceedings concerning legislative appor-
tionment have been completed). 
204. Seven Justices accepted the equal protection rationale. See Bush v. Gore, 531 
U.S. 98, 104-11 (2000) (per curiam opinion joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.); id at 133-35 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 145 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
737, 758, 763-64 (2001) (contending that this equal protection holding, although appeal-
ing as a potential avenue for expanding voting rights, had no basis in precedent or history 
and was not logically explained); Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 679, 684-85 (2001) (pointing out that all previous equal protection cases had 
involved a state's pre-election classification of voters based upon factors such as race, 
place of residence, wealth, or party). 
The concurring Justices identified an additional constitutional offense: The Florida 
Supreme Court had violated Article II by changing its Legislature's prescribed certifica-
tion deadline and its delegation of power to various state executive officials (such as the 
Secretary of State) and agencies (such as the county canvassing boards). Id at 112-22 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), discussed supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text. It 
may well be that the Florida Justices' political leanings influenced their statutory con-
struction and that other interpretations were more reasonable. Nonetheless, existing Su-
preme Court precedent mandated extreme deference to state court explications of state 
law as long as they had some plausible basis, and the Florida court's interpretation 
seemed to meet this exceedingly lenient test. See id at 135-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), 
discussed supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text; see also Harold J. Krent, Judging 
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Court's creation of a new equal protection right to be free from 
such discrepancies seems as specious as the Baker Court's asser-
tion that this Clause requires apportionment based solely upon 
population.205 
In sum, Bush is the conservative child of Baker. Both cases 
reached incorrect results through similarly defective reasoning. 
B. DIFFERENCES 
Critics on both ends of the political spectrum might reject 
my analogy because of seemingly major distinctions between 
Baker and Bush. Although I readily acknowledge certain differ-
ences, they have a negligible effect on my thesis. 
1. The Conservative Response 
Conservatives might argue that Bush is far less radical than 
Baker in terms of both its novelty and impact. Baker repudiated 
the traditional idea that the judiciary plays a limited role in our 
federal system-most importantly, that the justiciability doc-
trines impose barriers to judicial review and that federalism gen-
erally precludes federal judicial interference in internal state po-
litical matters. More specifically, Baker, Gray, and Reynolds 
reversed the Court's uniform precedent refusing to tamper with 
state apportionment decisions and its unbroken century-old un-
derstanding that the Equal Protection Clause did not apply to 
this area. Instead, Baker and its progeny authorized federal dis-
trict courts to reconstruct state governments qua governments. 
These cases thereby inflicted a wound to federalism far more 
devastating than the judicial thrusts that struck down pieces of 
legislation produced by state governments on social, cultural, 
and moral issues (e.g., contraception and crime) that had for-
merly been reserved to the states.Z06 
Judging: The Problem of Secondguessing State Judges' Interpretation of State Law in Bush 
v. Gore, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 493 (2001) (setting forth this argument in exhaustive de-
tail); Robert J. Pushaw, The Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Question Doc-
trine, and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reply to Professors Krent and Shane, 29 Fla. St. 
U. L. Rev. 603,616-19 (2001) (agreeing with this position). 
205. These cases illustrate the more general danger of a textualist approach that ig-
nores the Constitution's structure and history. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional 
Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of 
Article Ill, 1997 B.Y. U. L. Rev. 847, 847-55. 
206. See Grant S. Nelson and Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce 
Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve 
State Control Over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 113-19 (1999) (defending a classical 
Federalist theory of federalism that views uniformity as beneficial in commerce but det-
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Baker, then, was a pathbreaking opinion that has had a 
pervasive, profound, and long-lasting impact. That is precisely 
why Chief Justice Warren deemed it "the most important 
decision" of his tenure.207 By contrast, conservatives could claim 
that, although Bush made a big initial splash, its ripple effect 
should be comparatively small, for two reasons. 
First, while Baker broke new ground, Bush trod a well-worn 
path. Baker set a "precedent" that the Justices could intervene 
to resolve political crises by superimposing their own political 
beliefs onto the Constitution through the creation of new equal 
protection principles. It is not a coincidence that the majority in 
Bush soothingly cited several Warren Court cases establishing 
the right to equal treatment in voting matters.ZCJB Moreover, be-
cause Baker refashioned the political question doctrine into a 
multi-factor "test" that is almost entirely discretionary/09 the 
worst that can be said of the Rehnquist Court is that it stepped 
in imprudently, not unlawfully. In short, the very fact that Baker 
had already been decided makes Bush less objectionable. 
rimental as to social, cultural, ideological, and moral issues). 
207. See The Warren Court: An Editorial Preface, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 219, 220 (1968) 
(citing a statement by Chief Justice Warren). The watershed significance of Baker was 
not lost on Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, who wrote unusually long and vituperative 
dissents. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text. 
208. Sec Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104-05 (citing, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). In fairness, I 
should point out that not all scholars have dismissed the majority's equal protection hold-
ing. For example, Professors Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes have characterized Bush as 
the third stage in the development of the constitutional law of elections. First, the Court 
struck down state statutes imposing exclusionary conditions on access to the ballot box, 
such as white skin color (e.g., Herndon) and poll taxes (e.g., Harris). Issacharoff, et a!, 
When Elections Go Bad at 4, 7, 45,47 (cited in note 117). Second, through the "one per-
son, one vote" principle, the Court redesigned state legislatures to address how votes 
were aggregated to produce electoral outcomes. Id at 4, 7, 45-47. Third, Bush "ex-
tend(ed] these doctrines to the micro-level of the actual operation of the election ma-
chinery" in a presidential contest. Id at 47. Bush featured the same basic structure as 
those opinions, particularly in reaffirming that if state legislatures chose to allow popular 
election, they had to ensure equal protection. Id at 44, 47. 
Professor McConnell has contended that, although as an original matter the Court 
had little legal basis for extending the Fourteenth Amendment to voting rights, this juris-
prudence is now firmly entrenched. McConnell, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 663 (cited in note 
185). He concludes that the Bush majority properly applied established equal protection 
principles in striking down the Florida Supreme Court's order, which had allowed can-
vassing boards to use inconsistent and arbitrary vote-counting rules that had been formu-
lated for partisan political reasons. Id. at 659-73; see also John C. Yoo, In Defense of the 
Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 784-89 (2001) (arguing that federal judicial 
intervention into state electoral matters has become routine and that, more generally, the 
Rehnquist Court has taken an activist role in asserting its supreme power to interpret the 
Constitution in many crucial areas). 
209. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
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Considered from a purely political perspective, this argu-
ment has great force: What's good for the left-wing goose 
(Baker) should be good for the right-wing gander (Bush). None-
theless, from a legal standpoint, conservatives should hesitate to 
make it because it contradicts their advocacy of traditional con-
ceptions of adjudication and judicial restraint. Under their 
model, constitutional decisionmaking should involve identifying 
principles of law (found in the Constitution's text, history, and 
precedent) and applying them consistently across time-not cre-
ating an unprecedented equal protection "right" (to uniform 
standards in counting ballots) and suggesting that it will control 
only that case.210 Similarly, champions of judicial self-discipline 
should not invoke the malleability of the justiciability doctrines 
to excuse the Court's intervention. On the contrary, restraint 
should have led the Justices to exercise the (admittedly vast) dis-
cretion allowed by those doctrines to avoid becoming entangled 
in the presidential election dispute. 
Second, conservatives might predict that, unlike Baker, 
Bush will have a minimal ·future impact. Indeed, the Court ad-
mitted as much by confining its holding "to the present circum-
stances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes 
generally presents many complexities."211 If by "the present cir-
cumstances" the majority meant presidential elections decided 
by razor-thin margins necessitating a recount in one state, then 
Bush will almost surely never rear its head again. Even if "the 
present circumstances" were construed to encompass all con-
tested elections, however, the opinion focused narrowly on 
court-ordered recounts, not statutory differences among (and 
within) states concerning items such as voting machines, ballot 
designs, and the qualifications of canvassing board members.212 
210. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109 (stressing that its holding was "limited to the 
present circumstances"); Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice at 77, 81-84 (cited in note 172) 
(noting that many commentators, including some conservatives, had criticized this aspect 
of the majority's opinion). I have elsewhere described in detail the classical understand-
ing that courts should not make new law, but rather should ascertain and apply pre-
existing rules in light of precedent in order to ensure continuity and certainty. See 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Anicle Ill's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions 
of Federal Courts, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447,449-50, 472-79 (1994); Robert J. Pushaw, 
Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Couns and the Structural Constitution, 86 Iowa L. 
Rev. 735,741, 809,827 (2001). 
211. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109. 
212. The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise 
of their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections. In-
stead, we are presented with a situation where a state court with the power to as-
sure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount [without] some assurance that 
the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are 
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Concededly, Bush's long-term doctrinal impact will be neg-
ligible compared to Baker's. Again, however, true conserva-
tives-who value the consistent judicial application of legal prin-
ciples over time-should be alarmed by the Court's apparent 
caveat that its new Equal Protection Clause "law" will apply to 
that case alone. Moreover, despite this cautious language, 
Bush's broad reading of that Clause may invite litigation over 
discrepancies in ballot format and counting-and hence lead to 
further judicial lawmaking adventures. 
Finally, conservatives may contend that Bush dealt with the 
election of the President-a quintessentially national interest 
even though states run the election machinerf13 - whereas 
Baker involved the state's own legislature and implicated no 
genuine federal interest. This distinction has real bite. Nonethe-
less, for better or worse, our Constitution leaves the selection of 
presidential electors largely to state governments.214 Thus, Bush 
did infringe upon state control over elections, albeit not as egre-
giously as Baker. 
In conclusion, Bush admittedly cannot match Baker for 
novelty, impact, and intrusiveness. None of these factors, how-
ever, undermines my theme that the Court's process of deciding 
these two cases was remarkably similar-and similarly uncon-
servative. 
2. The Liberal Critique 
Liberals might highlight two key distinctions. First, Baker 
created constitutional electoral law that the Court intended to 
(and did) follow in later cases, while Bush was "limited to the 
present circumstances. "215 This argument is powerful in con-
satisfied. 
I d. 
213. The concurring Justices made precisely this point. See id at 112-15 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring). 
214. For that reason, the Warren Court apportionment cases most directly on point 
are those involving state districting that affected federal congressional elections. See 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (House of Representatives) and Gray v. Sanders, 
372 U.S. 368 (1963) (Senate), discussed supra notes 72-96 and accompanying text. See 
also Issacharoff, et al., When Elections Go Bad at 4-7, 24-25, 62, 75 (cited in note 117) 
(recognizing the direct federal constitutional and statutory commands that govern pr~si­
dential elections and the unique national interest involved, but noting that the Constitu-
tion still grants the states control over most of the pertinent election procedures--
including the resolution of disputes between candidates). 
215. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109. See Auerbach, 1964 S. Ct. Rev. at 70-71 (cited in 
note 52) (emphasizing that "one person, one vote" was a true constitutional. principle 
"for an expanding future," not a rule for "the passing hour") (quoting Benjarrun N. Car-
2001] LOOKINGATBAKER v. CARR 399 
trasting Bush to several apportionment cases, but not Baker it-
self. There the majority held that Tennessee voters had a justici-
able equal protection claim but studiously avoided explaining 
how that Clause had been violated, hoping that the threat of dis-
cretionary reapportionment b~ federal judges would compel leg-
islatures to act on their own. 16 Only when coercion failed did 
the Court articulate a legal ~rinciple for legislative representa-
tion-one person, one vote.Z1 
Nonetheless, the Court has adhered to that maxim ever 
since, in contrast to its apparent desire to restrict the Bush hold-
ing to its facts. This difference, however, has no bearing on my 
thesis: that both the Warren and Rehnquist Courts manufac-
tured new equal protection law, regardless of how they intended 
to apply it in the future.218 
Second, liberals might maintain that the Court in Baker 
sought to further democracy and vindicate individual voting 
rights, whereas in Bush it thwarted these goals.219 I have no rea-
dozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 83 (Yale U. Press, 1921)). 
216. See supra notes 22-50 and accompanying text. Baker thus constituted the worst 
kind of advisory opinion-one that provided no legal advice. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any "Dear John" Letters: Advisory Opinions in His-
torical Perspective, 87 Geo. L.J. 473 (1998) (book review) (discussing this practice). 
The Baker Court's pressure tactics seem at least as offensive as the Bush Court's 
"one-shot deal" approach. 
217. See supra notes 72-122 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of this 
standard). 
218. Professor Issacharoff unfavorably contrasts Bush with the reapportionment 
cases, which he deems a successful intervention into the political arena because the Court 
set forth a clear constitutional standard of "one person, one vote." Issacharoff, 68 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. at 640-41, 656 (cited in note 125). I am not persuaded, however, that a fabri-
cated constitutional doctrine becomes legitimate merely because it is crystallized in a 
simplistic slogan. For instance, I do not think that Bush would be more defensible if the 
Court had coined a "one recount, one standard" catch-phrase to govern judicial resolu-
tion of contested elections. 
219. See, e.g., Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice at 70-75 (cited in note 172) (deeming 
"curious" the majority's attempt to justify its exclusion of votes by invoking Warren 
Court cases that increased the number of voters and that ensured all votes would be 
weighted equally and counted correctly); Pamela S. Karlan, The Court Casts Its Vote, 
N.Y. Times A31 (Dec. 11, 2000), reprinted in E.J. Dionne, Jr. and William Kristol, eds., 
Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and Commentary 262-63 (Brookings Institution Press, 
2001) ("Commentary") (arguing that the Court in Bush (1) risked its reputation as a pro-
tector of voting rights by halting the recount of lawful votes, and (2) should not have in-
tervened because the political process was actively trying to resolve the problem-unlike 
the situation in the 1960s, when the Court had to step in because legislatures would not 
reform themselves); Issacharoff, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 638-41, 650-56 (cited in note 125) 
(to similar effect). But see Dionne and Kristol, eds., Commentary at 284-87 (reproducing 
an essay by Richard Epstein titled Constitutional Crash Landing and originally published 
in the Dec. 13, 2000 edition of the National Review Online contending that voters did not 
need Court-ordered reapportionment to participate equally in the election, but simply 
had to follow the directions on the ballot). 
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son to doubt that the Warren Court sincerely thought it was 
promoting democracy and the right to suffrage by mandating 
legislative representation based upon equal population. Yet I 
also have no basis for questioning the good faith of the 
Rehnquist Court's belief that it was saving the democratic proc-
ess and upholding the integrity of the votes cast. After all, the 
majority cited undisputed evidence that certain county canvass-
ing board members had repeatedly altered their standards for 
determining whether a ballot had been legally marked,220 for the 
apparent (some would say transparent) partisan purpose of try-
ing to help Al Gore garner more votes.22 The Justices also must 
have been suspicious that the Florida Supreme Court, composed 
entirely of Democrats, decided nearly every significant legal is-
sue in favor of Gore, the Democratic candidate.222 Thus, in their 
220. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106-08. 
221. Millions of Americans watching the hand recounts on television concluded that 
the changing standards reflected partisan motives, especially because it occurred in heav· 
ily Democratic counties and a more lenient standard (e.g., counting ballots that had been 
indented but not dislodged) would pick up votes that had not been detected by machines, 
which had twice given Bush the edge. Indeed, even fair-minded Democrats acknowl-
edged this problem. See, e.g., Alan Brinkley, What Now?, Slate (Nov. 22, 2000), re-
printed in Commentary at 195 (cited in note 219) ("(H]aving rejected that standard (i.e., 
allowing dimpled chads] earlier in the counting, it seems to me politically unwise, to say 
the least, to change the standard simply because the original standard wasn't producing 
enough Gore votes. That does seem calculating and unfair to me, even as a Democrat 
and a Gore supporter."). 
The Justices did not mention the unpleasant possibility of naked partisanship, but 
one can safely assume that they were aware of it, given the relentless media coverage. 
222. See, e.g., Triumph at 36 (cited in note 182) ("The Florida Supreme Court knew, 
of course, exactly what kind of recount procedures to adopt in order to maximize the 
likelihood that Gore would overtake Bush's lead.") (quoting Richard Posner); Stuart 
Taylor, Jr., Why the Florida Recount Was Egregiously One-Sided, Nat'l Journal 3932-33 
(Dec. 23, 2000), reprinted in Commentary at 332-36 (cited in note 219). This suspicion of 
political bias likely explains the unusual conclusion of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas that Florida's high court had changed-not merely interpreted-
its state's election statutes. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 116-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., con-
curring), discussed supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text. Although neither the 
concurring nor the per curiam opinion contains a direct accusation of partisanship, Jus-
tice Stevens assailed the majority for an "unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality 
and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote count 
were to proceed." See id at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
When judges enter the political thicket, they must be politically savvy. An example 
is the Court's unanimous decision to decline review of the Florida Supreme Court's ini-
tial judgment against Bush because of uncertainty over whether the state court had 
considered the relevant federal constitutional and statutory provisions. See Bush v. Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam). Three Florida Justices 
read between the lines and would have accepted this implicit invitation to save face by 
holding for Bush. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262-70 (Wells, C.J., dissenting); 
id at 1270-73 (Harding and Shaw, JJ., dissenting). Their four colleagues, however, issued 
another opinion that seemed almost designed to strike the Supreme Court's conservative 
Republican Justices as aggressively pro-Gore-for instance, by accepting 215 net Gore 
votes in Palm Beach County submitted after the Florida Supreme Court's own Novem-
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minds doing nothing may have enabled one state's Democratic 
partisans to bend (or perhaps break) the law to dictate the out-
come of a presidential election. This prospect may have struck 
the majority as worse than exposing themselves to the charge 
that they decided the case to ensure the victory of the Republi-
can candidate, George Bush.223 
Of course, it could well be that (1) the Justices' percer,tions 
were shaped by their own political or ideological biases,2 4 and 
(2) the most accurate result would have been yielded by a man-
ual recount under a general "intent of the voter" standard, sub-
ject to review by a judge to reconcile any discrepancies.225 But it 
is difficult for liberals to attack the Court on this score while si-
multaneously lauding Baker, which placed blind faith in the sub-
jective political instincts of a majority of Justices about what will 
best serve democracy and protect voting rights.226 If Baker is le-
gitimate as a matter of law, then it should make no difference 
ber 26 deadline. See id at 1260. Considered from a raw political standpoint, these Flor-
ida Justices displayed naivete in failing to realize (or to care) that their decision would 
prompt a reversal on the merits. 
223. See McConnell, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 659 (cited in note 185) (making this 
point). The Justices' knowledge that their judgment would effectively result in Bush's 
election contrasts with Baker and its progeny, which established general standards that 
did not benefit any particular candidate or party. The Warren Court likely understood, 
however, that its opinion would greatly increase the voting strength of liberals. 
The Rehnquist Court's dilemma was hardly unique. In post·election disputes, all 
government actors (including judges) realize that their decisions are outcome-
determinative. See Issacharoff, et al., When Elections Go Bad at 3 (cited in note 117). 
Not surprisingly, political officials continue to act in a partisan manner when given the 
chance to interpret (or even alter) election laws. Id Courts must "act with tremendous 
circumspection" because their integrity may be threatened by the political impact of any 
potential course of action. Id Yet the failure of judges to intervene could undermine the 
legitimacy of the political process itself. Id Thus, the Court was in a classic "damned if 
you do, damned if you don't" situation. 
224. This theory does not explain, however, why two of the Court's reliable liberals 
on constitutional issues, Justices Breyer (a Democrat) and Souter (a Republican), joined 
the majority's equal protection holding. Moreover, a straight party-line vote would have 
aligned both Souter and Justice Stevens (a Republican) with the majority on every issue. 
225. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 124-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stressing that the 
Florida Supreme Court's order establishing such a process was constitutionally ade-
quate). 
226. Professor Sunstein, a liberal supporter of Baker, has argued that the Court in 
Bush had a reasonable basis for concluding that its decision was necessary to restore or-
der and avert a constitutional crisis, even if its legal reasoning was weak. Sunstein, 68 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. at 758-59, 768-69 (cited in note 204). Although I applaud Sunstein's even-
handedness, I reject the "constitutional emergency" justification. See supra note 182. 
For similar reasons, I cannot accept Professor Issacharoffs claim that Baker, unlike 
Bush, involved a true electoral crisis because the political avenues of redress had been 
closed. See Issacharoff, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 638-41,650-56 (cited in note 125). There-
apportionment cases leave entirely to the Court's discretion the determination of 
whether the political process has malfunctioned and a constitutional emergency has 
arisen of sufficient magnitude to warrant intervention. 
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whether its application produces a liberal or conservative politi-
cal result. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Justices who decided Baker v. Carr undoubtedly had 
pure motives. But the road to hell is paved with good intentions. 
Legal giants like Justice Harlan and Robert McCloskey warned 
that the Baker Court's adherence to political dogma (no matter 
how noble) rather than legal principles would have dangerous 
consequences. 
They were right, as the Warren Court inadvertently laid the 
groundwork for Bush v. Gore. Both the Court and legal scholars 
should recognize that Baker and Bush are equally pernicious to a 
constitutional regime based upon the rule of law. 
